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Glossary of Islamic Technical Terms
Fiqh: This is the science of applying Shariʾa.
Hadd (pl. hudūd): The literal meaning is limit. The boundaries laid down by law. When applied in
the criminal law, it carries the meaning of unchangeable penalty or punishment handed down by
Allah for specific offenses.
Hadith (pl. ahadith): The report of the actions, sayings and consents of the Prophet Muhammad
(SAW).
Iʾizar: Hausa Language for the Arabic iʿdhar. It refers to a formal opportunity given by the judge
of a Shariʾa court to the individual(s) being trialed to challenge evidences.
Ihsan: This is a state for an adult who is free, mentally sound, who is or was a partner in legal
marriage.
Ijtihad: Refers to the technical application of judges make to arrive at the law from its sources.
Kwatacen Ciki: Hausa language for Sleeping embryo. It is used in reference to the principle of
“dormant embryo” in the Maliki jurisprudence.
Madhab (pl. madhahib): It refers to a school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).
Mohsan: Refers to a man (or mohsinat, a woman) in the state of ihsan .
Shubha: This means doubt with regards to illegal acts.
Qadhf: Means defamation. It falls under hadd offenses for it is an unfounded accusation of
adultery.
Rajm: Refers to stoning to death. It is a fixed penalty for zinā (adultery).
Zinā: Means adultery. Illegal sexual intercourse outside wedlock.
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ABSTRACT
The research engages in an exploration of human rights in Islam. Human rights issues are
then contrasted with international law positions. The data gotten is then used for investigating
women’s human rights issues in Shariʾa penal tradition regarding zinā (adultery) in Nigeria. The
re-emergence of Sharia penal codes adopted by 12 Northern states in Nigeria in 1999 as an
operative Islamic law has sparked concerns about rulings amounting to stoning to death in several
cases of zinā. These events raised concerns about Shariʾa penal traditions’ legality and relationship
with other legal traditions operational in Nigeria, a secular political space. (Chapter I)
Another element presented is the discrepancy between the theoretical viewpoint on
women’s human rights. How is this perspective applied to Muslim women jurisdictions? The
research uses the example of Shariʾa court cases with regards to zinā in Nigeria to illustrate the
branching between theory and practice of Shariʾa penal laws. Our essay shall consider Shariʾa
court proceedings and rulings of Safiyatu Hussaini and Amina Lawal cases of zinā for our
research.1 We shall focus on some of the infringed women’s rights violations articulated in the
primary court sources and other secondary sources. (Chapter II)
Chapter III is dedicated to evaluating the development of the court cases and ruling from
the zinā, as mentioned earlier in chapter II. The analysis provides an insight into areas of human
rights violations, especially against women. It demonstrates that where women and men had been
prosecuted for zinā, mostly women, have been charged and convicted of the crime. Therefore,
illustrating the gender biases exhibited in the court convictions and procedural neglects against the
women charged. However, the paper’s research will also proffer that women’s rights in Shariʾa

In 2002, Safiya Hussaini was sentenced to death by rajm under the new Shariʾa criminal codes in Sokoto. Amina
Lawal was sentenced to be stoned to death for zina in 2002. These two cases gained international recognition.
1

1

are not completely at odds with principles of international human rights standards of the United
Nations. The argument’s postulation stems from asserting that the Islamic penal tradition is not
inflexible. Based on its primary sources the Shariʾa lends itself to various explications in
jurisprudence (fiqh) to help circumvent issues bordering on abuse of women’s rights in Islam. The
jurisprudence of the Maliki Shariʾa Courts of Appeal in zinā cases will help illustrate this fact.
(Chapter III)
The research concludes by addressing the possibility of discerning the reconciliation
between international rights standards and Islamic women’s rights concerns. This thesis
acknowledges that there are aspects of women violations’ present in zinā-related cases and
establishes that there is room for reforms. However, in a pioneering manner, the essay considers a
more exhaustive review of the zinā cases above to argue against the notion that it is impossible to
attain any form of human rights or justice in Shariʾa courts for women. In order words, it challenges
the proposition that Shariʾa penal laws are incompatible with international human rights. This
research attempts to refute the position that Shariʾa penal codes are not-dynamic. The Shariʾa
Appeal Courts in Nigeria is saddled with the responsibility of safe guarding Shariʾa from a
reductionist approach to a holistic form that is multi-valued and teleological rather than causal.
Such a consideration bridges Shariʾa with regards to women rights issues in zina cases with the
spirit of international set norms for all human rights. (Chapter IV)
This thesis proposes that the Shariʾa Courts of Appeal ruling could be set as a benchmark
forum for further evaluative projects of the Shariʾa criminal and penal codes procedures. Adhering
to such reforms will be following the legacy of the Shariʾa committee of 1958-1962 set at bridging
Shariʾa law in the penal code of 1960 with human rights concerns. The 1999 Shariʾa committee
failed to meet this salient mark as discussed in chapter I.
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The paper ends on a note of suggestions for some considerations for Shariʾa criminal and
penal reforms at ordering and safeguarding women’s rights in Nigeria.2

BACKGROUND OF STUDY
In today’s world, the interplay between religion (in this case, Islam) and civil law, human
rights, and constitutionalism take prominence in intellectual circles and dialogues in international
and local spaces. It is vital to understand how the re-establishment of Shariʾa criminal law in
Northern Nigeria has influenced human rights issues, especially women’s rights. 3 The
international standard of non-discrimination based on gender as considered in the United Nation’s
human rights instrument led to the adoption of exterminating all discriminatory forms of against
women. In 1999, there was a resurgence of Shariʾa had codes in some Northern States of
Nigeria.4 Since this re- emergence cases of zinā (adultery) in Shariʾa courts have led to criticism
of Shariʾa penal codes on certain matters as contravening the significant arrangements of the
international human rights norms.
Women’s rights in S hariʾa (specifically with regards to Nigeria’s Shariʾa penal code ruling
in zinā cases) has always been of keen interest to me for about a decade now. The intricacy of the

Before 1960 (Nigeria’s independence), Shariʾa law was fully applied in Sokoto caliphate, northern Nigeria. It was
affected by colonial rule. Shariʾa penal codes were revoked at the dawn of Nigeria’s independence in 1960. From then
on, Islamic sharia law was limited to the law of family relations and personal rank. The settlement in 1960 brought
these changes: The Northern courts in which her qadis (judges) administered Islamic law witnessed changes in the
court systems and their judges become more Western-trained and less traditionally Muslim. In response to this trend,
the program of “implementation of Shariʾa” started in 1999 in 12 Northern states. It was an attempt at restoring
the status quo ante of Sharia before 1960.
2

The UN’s General Assembly adopted it on 18th December 1979 and entered into force on 3rd September 1981.
On 27th October 1999, Zamfara State adopted Shariʾa penal codes for criminal judgments, which came into force
on 27th January 2000. 12 states adopted Shariʾa penal codes into the crime legislation: Zamfara, Borno, Bauchi,
Gombe, Yobe, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, and Jigawa.
3
4
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research into women’s right issues, and its varied subject matters is captivating, requiring more
research in the area.5
RATIONALE AND OBJECTIVE
Our essay shall consider Shariʾa court proceedings and judgments of cases of zinā in
Nigeria.6 This study aims to analyze women rights issues with regards to zinā (adultery) in Islam
and conventual United Nation’s law as adopted in Nigeria’s 1999 national constitutions. It applies
this scientific approach to investigate Muslim women’s rights issues regarding Nigerians’ reemergence of the Shariʾa penal codes (1999) applications to cases of zinā. vital to this research is
its underpinning refutable to the “generalized” criticisms about Shariʾa’s inability at meeting
international human rights positions because Islamic legal traditions are tagged as a nonmonolithic entity.
Our research argues that the postulates of Shariʾa, do not incorporate of unyielding group
of rules; rather, regarded holistically and in non- reductionist approach, Shariʾa is in-built with a
dynamism sensitive at meeting human rights issues in every time and age.
This paper is a useful tool in comprehending Shariʾa law’s interaction (criminal and penal
procedure codes) and women’s rights. It is significant to the debate of justice for all.

5

Ann Mayer was keen on the relationship of rights as it interplayed in Islam and in international law. Her work took
a look at some women’s right issues in Shariʾa from the Middle East Islamic nations. Cf. Elizabeth Ann Mayer, Islam
and Human Rights: Traditions and Politics, 5th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007). There are rooms for further
researches. I have decided to look at the issues around women’s rights centered on zinā cases in Northern Nigeria.
In 2002, Safiya Husseini was charged for adultery and sentenced to rajm under the new Shari’a criminal codes in
Sokoto. In the same year, Amina Lawal was convicted of the same crime sentenced to death for zinā These two cases
gained international recognition and are models for considering the basic standings and standards for Zina cases in
Nigeria sharia courts today.
6
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
With an anthropological hindsight on our subject matter which concerns women right
issues in zinā court cases in Nigeria, our thesis shall use a deductive and comparison methodology
format. It shall present and analyze court case materials (both primary and secondary) from Shariʾa
Court records of first instance (Lower court and the Upper Shariʾa courts) to deduce information
on areas where zinā cases embedded formation of inequality that take their lawfulness from
deductions from Shariʾa. Thus, illustrating a reductionist approach of this arms of jurisprudence
and its implication for women’s right.
Next, our findings shall be compared with the interpretations of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts
(representing a wider and holistic interpretation of the laws) to illustrate how Shariʾa meets the
integrity of human dignity assured by the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria which heavily incorporates
international human rights laws.
Given its huge insistence on the interpretations and positions of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts
on zinā issues addressed, it also proposes this arm as a tool to help meet the need for ijtihad needed
to converge Islamic Shariʾa goals with international rights, especially regarding women’s right
issues. This is proposed as an avenue for amending the rushed process of the 1999 Shariʾa panel
committee to help it reach the models of its antecedents’ legacy of the Sharia committee of 19581962 as discussed in chapter one.

5

Chapter One
1. 0 A Contextual and Historical Consideration of Shariʾa Status in Nigeria
Introduction: 1999 to 2000 witnessed 12 northern States of Nigeria adopt Shariʾa criminal penal
codes. The re-emergence of Shariʾa’s criminal and penal codes is a reaction against the settlement
of 1960.7 In 1960 Shariʾa criminal law was revoked. From then on, Islamic civil law strictly carter
only to family relations and personal status laws. Our chapter, therefore, identifies the area of
contention about Shariʾa today (that is, criminal and penal codes) with regards to concerns about
her relationship with Nigeria’s constitutional laws and concerns about the Shariʾa criminal penal
codes meeting up with international human rights issues. This chapter shall expound on the
relationship between the legal traditions (customary, Islamic, and common law) of Nigeria to
establish Shariʾa criminal law’s status and scope today.
We shall further delineate the crux of the matter in the 1999 Shariʾa penal committee in
contrast to the 1958–62 Shariʾa panel, which amended applying the penal codes and principles to
bring Shariʾa criminal laws into harmony with international human rights.
1.1

Relationship and Status of Shariʾa in the Legal Traditions in Nigeria
Since the 9th century, Islam was brought into Northern Nigeria when Arab merchants had

trade contacts with Borno Caliphate. Shariʾa has been used at least since Shehu Uthman
established the Sokoto Caliphate in 1804.
What is the relationship and status of Shariʾa law in the legal traditions in Nigeria?

7

At Independence of the nation in 1960, trials were carried out to help develop a legalized way to consider different
religious adherents via meetings which included a committee on Islamic jurisprudence experts. The hudūd
punishments of Shariʾa were curtailed to other alternatives such as flogging, fines, and in some cases, imprisonment.

6

Intertwined to Nigeria’s political history is legal pluralism.8 British authorities controlled
the northern and southern protectorates separately. Both parts of the country were joined together
in 1914. In 1954, Nigeria was broken into 3 (three) parts. Each area was given considerable power
which made them advance along negligable variant lines. During the year 1967, including the
Capital city, Nigeria had 36 states. Despite the states’ subsequent creations, majority of the state
laws were unified laws of particular regions. The reason for this was because unified laws were
used in each of these regions before they became states. The conformity of Shariʾa and customary
laws in the northern states continued mostly until 1999, when 12 of these states adopted Shariʾa
as the essential origin of laws.
Legal diversity is multiplex in Nigeria; it has tripartite distinct forms. Laws in Nigeria comes
from these legal systems discussed next. Customary law is native law, with each aboriginal groups
having their specific local law.9 Hence, customary law constitutes legal diversity stemming from
the country’s diverse legal systems or legal cultures. In Nigeria, religion has intrinsic close links
with ethnicity and wider scope with regionalism.10 During the last half of the 18th century, Islam
was common and eventually emerged as state law in each emirate making up the Sokoto
Caliphates.11There were large numbers of adherents to other religions within the caliphates to
whom native laws applied.12 Yet, for the British administration at the colonial times, Islamic law

8

Nigeria consists of heterogeneous ethnic, religious, and legal elements. There are more than 250 ethnic tribes and
within these groups sub-groups. The Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa-Fulani, are the predominant tribes of the country. The
pluralistic nature of the nation makes for the diverse legal system practiced. The legal pluralism practiced in Nigeria
arises from the country’s diverse legal traditions or legal cultures.
9
Cf. Yemisi Dina, Guide to Nigerian Legal information, GLOBALEX (February 2005),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/nigeria.htm
10
There are categorical discourses on disparity between a “Muslim North,” and “Christian South.” We should note
that this is a misunderstanding. Muslims are predominant in the North, but there are non-Muslim groups from the
North too. Similarly, although Christians are predominantly more in the south, Islam has its pocket of adherents.
11

Cf. Mervyn Hiskett, The Development of Islam in West Africa (New York: Longman Inc. House, 1984), p. 172.

12

Cf. Ahmed Beita Yusuf, Nigerian Legal System: Pluralism and Conflict of Laws in the Northern States (New Delhi:
National Publication House, 1982), pp. 55, 71-75.
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is customary law. English laws (which widely govern the federal and State styled legal status) owe
their antecedents to colonialism. English laws operate within a Eurocentric ideology of law.13
The concept of “religious law” is a Western contraption of religion. Different from such a
view, there is an opinion between Islamic and Western thoughts on religious. Eurocentric
perception of religion is mostly seen as system of beliefs. This is not so in Islam. This is because
religion falls under two categories simultaneously: It is ones iman (belief) that encompasses the
manner of lifestyle (minhaj)14 lived. Islamic law is a fully developed legal body like civil law, or
common law. In the context of Islam, “religious law” refers solely to laws linked to worship
(ibadat) which is different from the laws associated to human interactivities (muamalat).15
Eurocentric classification of religious law and its Western legal traditions logically results
in a problematic categorization of religious law in Nigerian. The three legal systems (Islamic,
customary, and English-styled laws) are inextricably linked with religions.16 The common
legislation is transferable to Christianity, Shariʾa is assignable to Islam, and native laws are
associated with the religions of African locals.

The Eurocentric comparative law studies classify “religious law” along with its Western legal traditions. Western
legal traditions consist of civil law, socialist legal systems, and common law. They are considered “the three most
important families of law in the modern world”. Other legal systems are clustered together and given only religious
status. Shariʾa is dealt with from this stand view. For further clarification confer, Mallar, V.S. Journal of the Indian
Law Institute Vol.30, no. 3 (1988): 377-80. Accessed 17th January, 2021. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43951188.
13

Sayyid Abul Aʾla Mawdudi, The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change (Leicester: Islamic
Foundation, ed. Khurram Murad, 1984), pp. 79-81.
14

Yerushalmi, David, Shari’a’s “Black Box”: Civil Liability and Criminal Exposure Surrounding Shari’a -Complaint
Finance, (March 2008). Utah Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1105101
15

Cf. Abdul-Lateef Adegbite, Shariʾa in the Context of Nigeria, in The Shariʾa Issue: Working Paper for a Dialogue
(2000), pp. 57, 68-69.
16
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Considering the Nigerian situation, to insist that Shariʾa is “religious law” makes little
sense. As a result, the grouping “religious law” and “customary law” are maladroit for colloquy
about Shariʾa in the legal system of Nigeria.
At this juncture, it is reasonable to discuss about legal diversity in Nigeria under the threetiers of law as widely recognized legal systems.
1.1.1. The Position and Extent of Shariʾa and Customary Law in Nigeria
Customary law in Nigeria is a composite of cultural practices embraced by community
members as constituting power because of duration of usage. Statutory definitions in northern
Nigeria have Islamic law included in native law. The term “Native Law and Custom” absorbs
Shariʾa.17
In Nigeria the Shariʾa jurisprudence practiced is that of the Maliki madhab since the 13th
century. In Nigeria, the other Shariʾa schools are referred to sketchily. However, the Maliki school
of jurisprudence is given legal endorsement in the Shariʾa Court of Appeal.18
It becomes imperative to inquire, “What is the status of Islamic law (Shariʾa) in Nigeria?”
1.1.2. Status of Shariʾa in Nigeria
As noted above, aboriginal law includes Islamic law. Colonial authorities decreed the
position of Shariʾa as local law. On the contrary, scholars have illustrated the incompatibility of
classifying Shariʾa as customary law.19 Yet, this form of categorization was still followed until
recently. Some states abrogated those laws that reduced Shariʾa into native laws. This took place
in 1999.

17
18

Cf. Laws of Northern Nigeria, High Court Law (1963) Cap. (49), sub section 34.
Cf. Laws of Northern Nigeria, Sharia Court of Appeal Law (1963) Cap. (122), Sub-section 14.

Cf. AA Oba, “Islamic Law as Customary Law: The Changing Perspective in Nigeria”, The International and
Contemporary Law Quaterly Vol. 51, Cambridge University Press (2002) 817.
19
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Therefore, we can deduce two phases concerning the status of Islamic law in Nigeria: First,
Shariʾa’s status (as customary law) through the settlement of 1960-62. Second, the status of Shariʾa
(as religious law) in 1999.
1. 2

An Attempt at Reform of Shariʾa through the Settlement of 1958-62
“The Shariʾa settlement of 1960” which was accepted by the hegemony of Muslims in

northern Nigeria was applied in succession of parliamentary validating in the dawn of
independence was of crucial occasion in the history of Shariʾa implementation in Nigeria. Before
independence in 1960, the Shariʾa, alongside its penal laws, were still “widely, applied in Northern
Nigeria than anywhere else outside Arabia”.20
The northern regional government, by 1957, recognized the need for legal and judicial
reforms. Details of the settlement of 1960 was carried out in consecutive stages. Delegation of
Islamic scholars were assigned to other Islamic countries to study the legal processes there which
took place in 1958.21 The government commissioned an international body of scholars to visit
Northern Nigeria saddled with the responsibility of examining the present legal workings and to
give recommendations for growth. It took place from August to September in 1958. This team of
jurist submitted that there should be an introduction of a new Islamic penal code in which the scope

20

J.N.D. Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1955), p. 219.

We read from the Panel of Jurist submitting a report to the governor: “His Excellency Sir Gawain Westray Bell,
K.C.M.G.,(Governor of the Northern Region of Nigeria), “Your Excellency, We were charged on the 29th July, 1958,
by your government, as a Panel of Jurists with this reference: “In the light of the legal and judicial systems present in
other parts of the world where Muslims and non-Muslims live side by side, and with reference to the systems obtaining
in, Pakistan, Lybia, and the Sudan, to consider the following: i) The processes of law at present in force in the Northern
Region, that is, Islamic law, British styled law as modified by the Nigerian legislation, and customary law, and the
organization of the judiciary empowering the systems and ii) Whether it is possible and how far is it possible to prevent
any forms of conflict which may perdue in the systems of law being practiced, and to make recommendations as to
the means by which this object may be accomplished and as to the reorganization of the courts and the judiciary, in
so far as this may be desirable.” For a clear account of the successful effort of persuasion, perhaps the chief
accomplishment of Jurists’ Panel. Confer James N. Anderson, “Conflict of Laws in Northern Nigeria: A New
Start”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 8 (1959), 442-456 at 451-53.
21
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of Shariʾa be limited to deal with personal status and family relations exclusively.22 The Northern
House Assembly adopted the recommendations of the commission in December 1958. Henceforth,
Shariʾa jurisprudence did not handle criminal cases. Criminal cases were dealt with under
modified penal codes of the British law and adopted for Northern Nigeria. Although the Islamic
Penal Code had other components of Shariʾa, the British administration removed weightier
chastisement, for example, amputation and death by stoning. However, floggings continued as a
form of punishment.
Shariʾa hudūd was revoked in 1960. Since then, the implementation of Shariʾa treated personal
status and family relations cases.
At the Government’s invitation, the team of experts returned in 1962 to evaluate the
application of their earlier directives and give further advice.
1.3

Re-emergence of Shariʾa’s Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes in 1999
Shariʾa has been practiced for many decades in northern Nigeria because most of its

inhabitants are Muslim. Yet, it was not until 1999-2000, that its range covered both criminal law
and personal status law. Thus, Shariʾa Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes’ re-introduction did
mark a significant shift for many Muslims. It entails the power to apply in full penal criminal codes
according to Shariʾa over convicted Muslim persons.

Article 8 “Civil and Domestic Law: The “Shariʾa” which is on the table of the legislative Houses (December 1958)
reads:
“The Panel has recommended that, with the introduction of the Northern Nigerian Penal Code, Moslem Law as such
should are confined to the law of personal status and family relations and, when applicable, to civil cases. Personal
status and family relations are meant questions of marriage, paternity, divorce, guardianship of minors, interdiction,
guardianship of interdicted persons, waqfs, gifts, wills, and succession (except for claims to immovable property) in
respect of Muslim litigants. Civil litigation, claims to the ownership of immovable or movable property, and questions
of a tort, would be dealt with respectively under statute law, customary law, or the law under which the parties
concluded their contract.”
For a detailed record confer Ostien: Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook: Vol.
I. Chapter 1, Part IV, pp. 49-56.
22
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The Shariʾa Establishment Law was commenced in Zamfara State on 27th October 1999 and
enacted on January 2000. The Zamfara state governor, Ahmed Sani, officially launched the Shariʾa
implementation program on Wednesday, 27th October 1999.23 This event was revolutionary for it
reverted the status quo and the attempts of the 1962 jurist’s adjustments to the 1960 Shariʾa law
settlement at bridging Shariʾa law in the penal code of 1960 with human rights principles. This
event was a catalyst for other states with weighty Muslim numbers. The Gusau convention had in
its attendance important dignitaries of various Muslim organizations within Nigeria. Addresses
were given by the leading Ulamaʾ and leaders signaling the phase of the Shariʾa implementation
in Nigeria. In a rapid and successive manner 11 states more all adopted Shariʾa jurisprudence for
criminal matters. In doing so, Shariʾa courts could abjugated over criminal cases. The government
of these states oversaw the implementation of Shariʾa. The Governors appointed committees –
usually called “Shariʾa Implementation Committees” – whose recommendation were to
meticulously analyse the procedures to be taken, to take into cognizance Shariʾa jurisprudence and
its relation to constitutional concerns, to evaluate public thoughts and give its reports to the
governor. The implementation bodies checked their ideas with the ulamaʾ and jurists. They
conducted public pool and debates. Other States that had established Shariʾa prior were also
visited; Zamfara State, which led the way, was much visited.24 Zamfara’s Shariʾa code of criminal

Popular Newspaper (The Guardian) in Nigeria reports about this event: “The occasion was fixed at the Ali Akilu
Square for 8:00am, but interestingly enough the square came to full capacity on the eve of the launching. Around
10:30 a.m., the Governor, Ahmad Sani, made a triumphant entry into the square. At the sight of the Governor entering
into the arena, the shouts of Allahu Akbar (God is Great!) filled the air. while he managed to squeeze his way to the
high table where other dignitaries were seated”. Cf. Fidelis Agu, “The Birth of Sharia”, The Guardian, 30th October
1999.
23

Upon the report from Shariʾa Implementation Committee, the state governments appointed a “White Paper
Committee”, whose duty it was to formulate the ideas and plans for the government. Cf. Philip Ostien: Sharia
Implementation in Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook: Vol. II. Chapter 2, Part 1, p. 3. (From here on: A
Source Book)
24
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procedure and penal codes is applied by most of the 12 northern states. However, only Niger State
amended her existing laws to make them align with the recommendations of the implementation
committee.
In establishing the new status for the Shariʾa project, the following steps were taken to adopt
the laws without violating the Nigerian constitution sections.
1.3.1. The Steps Taken and Arguments for Legality of Shariʾa Penal Codes
Ahmed Yarima Sani, Governor of Zamfara State, desirous of fulfilling his bond and the
desire of the masses to implement Shariʾa, went on to constitute a board of experts to:
1. Evaluate the present laws by their conformity with cultural values of the people;
2. Study and analyze the formation of local courts;
3. Make possible efficacious management of Shariʾa jurisprudence in the State.
The board of experts is to make salient observations, especially on constitutional provisions in
defense of the Shariʾa Penal Code and the need to meet up with the obligatory conditions in section
36(12) of the 1999 Nigerian Federal Constitution which reiterates that for effectuation of any
criminal charge(s), these crimes and their penalties must be authorized in codified laws that are
validated by a legislature. Ostien observes that inputs from counties with established Maliki
madhabs and jurisprudences were collected. Following the Maliki madhab, all criminal offenses
and their punishments are distinguished under hudūd, taʾzir, and qisas. Therefore, punishments
such as rajm, caning, and their likes, are included in the criminal code system.25 Therefore, the
Shariʾa Criminal Procedure Code was established for the examination of offenders and the
execution of a judgment according to the Shariʾa.26
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Cf. Ostien, A Sourcebook: Vol. II. Chapter 2, Part III, pp. 171-2.

The Shariʾa Penal Code is essential for the prosecution and execution of the Penal Codes. It provides legitimacy for
the execution of Sharia in accordance with the Country’s constitution.
26
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Area Courts Repeal Laws was enacted to repeal former established local Courts and the
jurisdiction executed there in within the northern States for Shariʾa Courts have been put in their
stead. Section 277 in the 1999 Constitution limits the power of these former Area Courts.
Therefore, circumventing this limitation, Amendment Law of Shariʾa Court of Appeal was
established. The reformed established Shariʾa Courts are given authority over hudūd judgements,
and redress of their rulings are automatically referred to the Shariʾa Court of Appeal.
Logically, this jurisdiction stood because to argue contrary to its extension is to support the
motion for the denial of the human right of any appellant (for example, individuals who may be
pronounced guilty and sentenced to stoning to death) the right of fair hearing at the Shariʾa Court
of Appeal. This reasoning is logically deducible because, the 1999 Constitution allows for the
founding of Shariʾa Courts having control over criminal cases, and with the powers of
administrating punishments. Even more so, it provides for due process of law which necessarily
leads to the establishment of an appellate court (Shariʾa Court of Appeal) to listen to its appeals.
The model of Shariʾa criminal court established is as follows: The lower Shariʾa Courts
and Upper Shariʾa Courts. The Upper Shariʾa courts also have quasi authority to address cases
from the Lower Shariʾa Courts. The apex of Shariʾa court structure is the Shariʾa Court of appeal.
This court is saddled with redressing cases from the lower courts. Around four to five Qadis
(judges) oversee the Sharia Court of Appeal. Qadis of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts are experienced
in Islamic fiqh. An appellant who wishes to have their judgements from the lower courts redressed
are given a 30 days period to appeal.
A transition period of about six months was taken to study and implement the Shariʾa Penal
Code and Criminal Procedure 2000. Compared to the 1962 jurist’s adjustments to the 1960 Shariʾa
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law settlement, this time frame is relatively concise. The 1999 sharia legislation was quickly and
incompletely rushed.
1. 4

Other Literary Assessment of Historical Development of Sharia in Northern

Nigeria
Several literary corpuses give further retrospection on the evolution (and its application) of
the Sharia in Colonial Northern Nigeria. Scholars are unanimous in this matter and none of them
dissented. Takehiko Ochiai, a specialist on politics and religion in Nigeria, researched on the
changes in the system of native courts (of which Sharia courts were included) in Northern Nigeria.
His research covered a time span from 1900, when this region was made a British protectorate,
until 1960, when she gained independence as part of Nigeria. Ochiai, classified the evolution into
three epochs; namely: The first epoch is the preservation period (1900-1932). This is the period
from the proclamation of the Northern protectorate to the judicial reforms. The second epoch is
the subjugation period (1933-1953). This is the period during which the Islamic judiciary was
subjected to the English laws and courts. The third epoch is the period of compromise (1954-1960).
This period covers from the establishment of the Nigerian Federation to its independence. This is
the time when Nigerian-Muslim led members of the Northern parts voluntarily chose to restrict
Sharia’s application to personal criminal law.27
Prior to judicial reformation in the 1930s, when aims were made to review the legal order
of the aboriginal courts (Shariʾa courts inclusive) and English courts, the Shariʾa courts were
mostly autonomous, except in matters where restrictions were imposed partially, especially in
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Cf. Takehiko Ochiai, (August, 2020), “The Application of Sharia and the evolution of the native court system in
colonial Northern Nigeria (1900-1960)”, Asian Journal of African Studies Vol. 49, pp. 86-105.
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matters of ḥudūd.28 Commenting on the preservation period, David Smith, a specialist on native
courts in Northern Nigeria, notes that the interference with the systems of the native courts after
the Proclamation Acts of 1906 was not extensive as permissible. Through administrative control,
interference which was permitted was moderated.29 For about 30 years until the judicial reform in
1930s, the first period could be justly called preservation period.
Researches on the second period (the epoch of subjugation) illustrate that the sole aim was
to revise the dual legal systems (native court systems, which also encompassed Shariʾa, and the
English). In 1933, reforms put an end to provincial laws. These were replaced with Magistrate and
High Courts. Magistrate courts were subjugated to the High courts. Keay and Richardson opines
that the effect of this reform to the native courts was the extension of appeals. Before the 1933
reforms, dissatisfied rulings submitted by Alkali courts could be filed for appeals to the Emir
Courts because the Native Court Ordinances of 1933 had permitted for the power to appoint Emirs
and head chiefs of courts to serve as Native Courts of Appeal. 30 With the reform of 1933, for the
first time, unsatisfied appellants with the rulings of the Alkali courts were not restricted to the
higher native appeal courts of the Emir, but could apply to English courts like the Magistrate
Courts. The reforms therefore, linked native courts to English courts through the appeal systems.

28

The first article of the Native Courts Proclamation Act in 1906 was issued by British administration of Sokoto. The
sole aim of the proclamation was to insert Islamic judiciary at the center of the native court system. The result of this
was the classification into two groups: First is the Al-Qali courts in which Islamic judges served as head judges
with ulamā; second is the judicial council was defined as native court consisting of Emirs and community head chiefs
who presided over trials. The Native courts were empowered based on the proclamation to oversee trials based on
native laws and customs (Shariʾa inclusive), with the power to sentence the guilty to punishment. However, penal
actions that were deemed ‘abhorrent to natural justice and humanity’ were prohibited. This meant partial ban
of ḥudūd prescribed by Sharia, such as amputation, or death by stoning. Cf. Elias T. Oluwale, The Nigerian Legal
System, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Publication, 1963), pp. 120-121.

David Smith, “Native Courts of northern Nigeria: Techniques for institutional development”, Boston University
Law Review, 48 (1), (1968), pp. 55-56.
30
Cf. Richardson and Keay, The Native and Customary courts of Nigeria, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1966), pp.
38 -40.
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Consequentially, English courts were seen as superior to native courts, which in turn created the
misinterpreted perception that English criminal law was superior to native (Shariʾa) law. This was
a ‘subjugation period’ in Shariʾa’s implementation.
In the third phase, the leaders of the Northern Region paved the way for overhauling the
native court system. They sought a political compromise regarding Sharia execution. With the
prospects of independence imminent, the government of the Northern region began to examine
Sharia applications, especially its provisions on punishment. The government drafted a new
criminal code adopted in 1959. This penal code did contain some Sharia provisions on punishment,
but its application was limited. According to Norman Anderson, an expert in Islamic law, colonial
Northern Nigeria, uncodified Islamic criminal laws faded when the new, codified criminal code
and its procedural law went into effect at the time of independence.31 In the third phase, it was not
the colonial administrators that developed the native system but the Nigerian Muslim-led
government. They also chose the path to voluntarily abandon Islamic criminal law and restrict
Sharia’s application to personal law to alleviate concerns held by non-Muslims and foreign
companies. They sought political compromise regarding Sharia’s execution. As such, this phase is
the period of compromise.
Since independence, Shariʾa clauses on punishments were virtually banned and not legally
applied in the region. Later in the 21st century (from 2000 onwards), in its movement to apply
Islamic law, centered on the re-introduction of Sharia’s provisions on punishment, twelve states in
Northern Nigeria created a separate Shariʾa penal code, or the 1959 Penal Code was revised to
include Sharia codes on punishment.

31

Cf. Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World, (London: The Athlone Press, 1976), p. 27.

17

Since then, there are cases and allegations of violations of accused persons’ human rights
argued against Shariʾa criminal courts. Some of the famous critiques surrounded the abuse of
women’s rights regarding zinā (Adultery).
We shall take an analytical look at some of these cases in chapter two.
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Chapter Two
2. 0

Some Court Cases of Zinā in Shariʾa Penal and Criminal Code Considerations

Introduction: At the dawn of western legislative organizations in the early 20th century, the
application of shariʾa law were progressively limited to carter for personal status concerns in
Northern Nigeria. However, in the close of the 20th century, the revival of Islam in both political
and religious spheres began to challenge and change the process and limitations of Sharia
application. Shariʾa penal and criminal codes were carefully revived and fixed into the criminal
legislative structures. It was done in varying degrees and grafted with the aid of modern states.
Amongst hudūd laws and penalties, zinā (adultery) has been most controversial.
With the advent of Shariʾa court jurisprudence several death sentences in cases dealing with
hudūd crimes have been handed down since 2000. These sentences cut across both men and
women. Their offenses include adultery, homosexuality, and murder. With regards to zinā cases,
the number of women affected is disproportionate to the number of men because of the varying
requirements of evidences demanded. For example, a man that is being prosecuted for the crime
of zinā requires the evidence of four witnesses at the scene of the crime. The same requirement of
four witnesses is needed when a woman is facing charges of zina. However, other requirements
can be used as evidence for the crime, such as pregnancy.
Two primary questions need to be asked in order to comprehend the reasons for women's
rights concerns since the resurgence of zinā laws: Firstly, what is the context of zinā as an idea in
the Islamic fiqh tradition? Secondly, what is the situating of zinā as a set of juridical postulations
in Shariʾa as applied via fiqh (established rules that are derived) of the Shariʾa criminal and penal
laws in Nigeria? With regards to the second consideration, our research shall deal with primary
court records from the trial proceedings of some zinā cases. We hope that the data gathered will
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give us a closer look at the court proceedings to see where abnormalities and issues may bother
the violation of women’s rights and gender biases. Most especially, we hope it also presents data
(facts) arguing for the adaptability of Shariʾa penal codes procedures to uphold social rights issues
such as dignity to life and respect for women dignity. To illustrate this, we shall consider the
latitude provided and applied by Shariʾa court judges of the Appeal court to emphasize repentance
and preserve life by repealing the judgments of the lower courts.
2.1: Zinā in Islamic Legal Traditions
Classical Islamic legal traditions did not deal with crime in the sense that criminal law is used
today. Within the Islamic legal tradition, legal doctrines prescribed punishments for acts that are
considered crimes under the category “Islamic criminal law”. Classical jurisprudence
(fiqh) categorizes offenses into three groups in relation to rules and the punishment they
sustain: taʿzir,32 qisas,33 and hudūd.
Hudūd (singular, hadd: means limit or restriction) means limits prescribed by God. These
are offenses that have stipulated penalties derived from the Qurʾān or Sunna. Hudūd offenses are
five. Namely, robbery (qatʿal-tariqhiraba), theft (sariqa), drinking wine (shurb al-khamr),
unsupported allegations (qadhf), and adultery(zinā)). These first three are actions that breach
public interest, while the last two are transgressions against God. Hudūd crimes are considered
crimes against religion.

32

Ta‘zir (means discipline), involves offenses that are not under the categories of hudūd and qisas. Ta‘zir disciplines
are lesser than hadd’s.
33

Qisas means retribution. These are offenses carried out against neighhour, such as physical injury of another person.
These offenses are limited to matters of private spheres. There are fixed penalties to crimes and also victims may
choose to forgive their offenders or ask for compensation (diya).
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Fiqh madhabs do not all agree on the statutory elements and pieces of evidences to be used
when examining offenses; nor do they agree on the liberating conditions and punishments required
in the three offenses against public interest. Hudūd crimes, on the other hand, have stringent links
to revelation and textual basis. Zinā falls under this category.
Closer scrutiny of classical judges substantiates that when addressing zinā crimes, they
relied on even the smallest conditions of doubts to prevent application of hadd penalties, especially
in relation to women accused of zinā by their spouses or people in their environments. For instance,
in the attempt to curb abuses, in Suratul Hujurat, limits and restrictions are stated for the class of
those who can bring charges of zinā. Jurist such as Iman Shafiʾi submits that even leaders have no
authority to command a anyone accused of zinā to investigate the accusation.
Classical jurists depended on Qurʾanic verses and the traditions of the Prophet to abrogate
the infringement of the solitude and dignity of persons, particularly of women. Verses in the Holy
Qur'an stipulate difficult requirements for establishing hadd crimes such as zinā such that
practically, to be able to validly demonstrate and convict any individual for such crime is highly
impossible.
An unfounded assertion (qadhf) is ipso facto a hadd offense, punishable by 80 lashes (Qurʾan 24:
23). In cases where a woman is found with child and her spouse mistrust her for adultery, in order
to get around hadd penalty of qadhf, he will have to reject fatherhood and separate from her by the
process of liʿan (reciprocal taking of oaths and curses). In the occasion where the woman also
takes the oath of denial, she is exonerated from the crime of zinā (Quran 24. 6-7).
Another measure put in place in order to help acquit people from crime of zinā is the principle of
retraction from a confession of zinā. An individual who had confessed to the act of adultery can
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retract their confession at any time. The idea of shubha 34 exonerates from the crime of illicit
sexual relations. For instance, when a man mistakenly swaps another woman for his legitimate
wife, or vice versa, if she mistakenly assumes another man to be her husband, and they both have
sexual intercourse, on account of the element of Shubha, they are both exonerated from zinā. Jurists
aver that the prescribed 100 lashes for zinā offenses are prohibitionary rules and not necessarily
penal. The following verse illustrates this fact: “Let no man guilty of zinā or fornication marry
any, but a woman similarly guilty (of zinā), or an unbeliever. To the believers, such a thing is
forbidden.” (Quran 24. 3). Sexual decorum, a certain amount of guarantee of true paternity, and
virtue are guarded by the submission of jurist on zinā.
In 2000, at the introduction of the Shariʾa Penal Codes, death penalty was extended to
include crimes of adultery.35 This was a significant introduction to the jurisprudence of Shariʾa
because prior to its resurgence, penalties for zinā were either served by financial fines and prison
terms. Penalties are different for unmarried and married culprits of zinā crime. The sentence of
rajm is reserved to married people or divorced; while unmarried persons get the punishment of
100 lashes.
The death penalty cases of Safiyatu Husseini and Amina Lawal sparked several interest.
These cases where exceedingly intriguing because the men allegedly accused of carrying out the
offenses were acquitted on the postulation of the lack of evidence (with regards to the men, four
witnesses were required to corroborate the accusation against them). The same postulation was not
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The instructions on doubt (shubha) is founded upon the words of Mohammed: “God’s punishments will not be
executed in cases where there is room for doubt”. For further study on this subject matter, confer FIERRO, M. “Idru
l-Hudūd bi-l-Shubuhat: When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt”, Hawwa: Journal of Women of the Middle East and the
Islamic World, Vol. 5, n. 2-3, (2007) pp. 208-238.
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Zinā is defined thus: “Whoever, a man or a woman, fully responsible, has sexual intercourse through the genital of
a person over whom he has no sexual rights and in circumstances in which no doubt exists as to the illegality of the
act, is guilty of the offense of zinā.” Cf. Zamfara State Shariʿa Penal Code Law 2000, Section 126.
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the case for the women. Although there were no witnesses to corroborate the crime of zinā, the
women were convicted based on the evidences of pregnancy and child birth, respectively. They
were sentenced to rajm. Evidently, different standards for evidence required of both sexes allude
to the discrimination against women.
2. 2

Some Case Studies of Zinā in Northern Nigeria

2. 2. 1. The Case Against Safiyatu Husseini (Sokoto State)
Safiyatu Husseini was a divorced 35 years old mother of 5 children. She is from a poor
background and grew up in Tungar Tudu, Sokoto State. She was initially married at a very young
age (12yrs) but divorced not quick long after that. It is a usual practice to get married several times
in Hausa culture so she got married two more times. All of her marriages ended up in divorces. It
was after her last marriage that she got romantically involved with another man. His name is
Yakubu. He was the man she allegedly accused of raping her and getting her pregnant. On 9
October, 2001, the Upper Shariʾa Court in Gwadabawa convicted her of zinā and she was
sentenced to death by rajm.
On 23rd December 2000, she was presented before local Shariʾa implementation committee.
The committee got her detained in the police station. After that, Safiyatu was charged in the lower
Shariʾa Court for the allegation of zinā.36 After her trial, she was found guilty. The case was then
referred to the Upper Shariʾa court. The case went through strenuous processes and here too, she
was convicted for zinā.37 She maintained that she was raped by Yakubu. In her words, she narrated
what transpired:
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Cf. Ogbu Kalu, ‗Safiyya and Adamah: “Punishing Adultery with sharia stones in Twenty-First-Century Nigeria”
In African Affairs (2003) http://afraf.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/102/408/389.pdf. p. 394. (Accessed 5 January, 2021).
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Cf. News Release by Amnesty International USA ‗Nigeria: BAOBAB for Women’s Rights and Amnesty
International Statement on the Implementation of New Sharia-based Penal Codes in Northern Nigeria. 25 March 2003.
p.1.
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He ambushed me and the whole event was insane. He forced himself on me using his
strength to overpower me. At another occasion, when I visited a neighbouring village, he
forced himself on me there and had sexual intercourse with me. This happened three times.
After the act, I informed him that I was displeased with his action and committed the entire
affair in Allah’s hands for he took advantage of me and I was ashamed to report the affair
to anyone.38
Establishing the date of Safiyatu’s conception was an integral element in the process of
appeal against the conviction. Her lawyers argued that Safiyatu’s conception occurred prior to the
enactment of Shariʾa in the state, that is in June 2000.39 Therefore, it was illegal to establish any
crime against her for a law that was not existent at the time of the event. To this claim, the
prosecution team replied that irrespective of the time of her conception, Maliki jurisprudence
recognizes pregnancy as prima facie evidence for zinā crime. After weaning her baby, the penalty
of rajm (stoning) will be carried.40 After the court’s ruling, she expressed her dissatisfaction:
“I felt like dying that day because of the judgement. I never thought there would be such a
penalty. It is because I am poor, my family is poor, and I am a woman.”41
The man alleged to be her accomplice, Yakubu, refused that he had sexual relations with her. Since
there were not enough witnesses to refute his claims, he was set free for the lack of evidence. On
the other hand, Safiyatu was found guilty on two counts, first, on the evidence of her confession
to having sexual relations out of wedlock and second, on the fact of her pregnancy.
The following are excerpts42 from the findings and rulings in the Upper Shariʾa Court (this
is trial of the first instance), which found Safiyatu Hussaini guilty of the crime of zinā.
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Okorie Uguru interviewed Safiya, ‘Amina Lawal: Let Off the Hook” in The Comet 27 September, 2003. p. 11.

Lamido, ‘The real crime is being a woman’ in http://scotsman.com network of Friday 25 January, 2002. (Here
after, Lamido, “The Real Crime” will be used).
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Lamido, ‘The Real Crime’, 25th August 2002.
42
Philip Ostien provides an apt and good record of the Court documents on the manner of judgement. The cases of
Safiyatu and Amina are translated into English and analyzed in the book, Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria
1999-2006: A Sourcebook Vol. 5, Two Famous Cases (Ibadan: Spectrum Books, Ltd, 2007). I have been able to extract
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On 3 July 2001, the case file number USC/GW/F1/10/2001 was issued to the Upper Shariʾa
Court, Gwadabawa presented an allegation of zinā against Yakubu Tangar Tudu and Safiyatu
Hussaini Tundar Tudu. The judge overseeing the case is Muhammadu Bello Sanyinnawal.
The statement of the complaint reads:
I, police sergeant Idrisu Abubakar No. 125816, on behalf of the Commissioner of Police,
indict Yakubu Abubakar Tungar Tudu, and Safiyatu Hussaini Tungar Tudu, from
Gwadabawa Local Government Area, on the allegation of committing zinā contrary to
sections 128-129 Sokoto State Shariʾa Penal Code 2000. On 23th/12/2000, at around 2:00
p.m., the Gwadabawa police unit received a complaint that Safiyatu Husseini
committed zinā with Yakubu Abubakar as a result of which she became pregnant. They are
both known to have been married once. After interrogation, the police is satisfied with the
allegation leveled against them. I, therefore, sue you before this Court so that you will be
tried accordingly.43
The court proceedings are as follows:
The Upper Shariʾa Court recognized the offense.44 The accused persons listened to charges
against them, after which they were both asked if they understood the complaints and agreed to
the alleged offense made against them? The first accused (Yakubu Abubakar) said: “I did not
commit this offense.” “I did not commit zinā with her.” Safiyatu Hussaini said: “I heard and
understood the complaint they made against me.” “It is true that Yakubu Abubakar
committed zinā with me. He impregnated me, and I have a baby girl aged six months today.”45 The
Court asked Safiyatu if she had heard that the accused, Yakubu, had rejected her claims about him?

and summarize vital details of the records and modified some of the translations especially from Hausa to come closest
to what is recorded in the paper and not just the sense as presented by Philip.
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Proceedings and Judgment in the Safiyatu Hussaini Case. Confer, Philip Ostien, Sharia Implementation in
Northern Nigeria 1999-2006: A Sourcebook Vol. 5, p. 17.
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In the Shariʾa Criminal Procedure Code Law 2000”, section 12(1) Chapter III; states that “Subject to the other
provisions of this Shariʾa Criminal Procedure Code, the Upper Shariʾa Court shall have the exclusive power to try
any or all the offenses listed in ‘Appendix A’ of this Code”.
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Op. Cit., p. 18.
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She affirmed that she did. The prosecutor’s bench was then asked if it had evidence to prove the
allegations?
The prosecutor presented witnesses for the case. Therefore, they applied for a date to open
the case. The upper Shariʾa court rescheduled hearings to 17/7/2001. Safiyatu and Yahaya were
were freed on bail.
In the court proceedings of 17 July 2001, the testimony of two prosecution witnesses (PW)
was heard. The first prosecutor witness (PW1) presented is Abdullahi Tungar Tudu. He is elderly
was 64year old at the time and a Muslim. He was the first witness. The second prosecution witness
(WP 2) is Attahiru Tungar Tudu. He is a man in his mid-40’s and a Muslim. Both of these men
resided in Gwadabawa local government.
The proceeding of the Court is as follows:
Prosecution Witness 1 (PW1) Abdullahi Tungar Tudu, swore to narrate the truth. And the Court
asked him about his knowledge of the case. He gave the following testimony:
What I, Abdullahi Tungar Tudu, know of this matter is that, some time ago, two policemen
came and met us at Tungar Tudu. One of them is called Ali. They called Safiyatu in my
presence and informed her that they heard that she was pregnant even though she was out
of wedlock. They inquired from her who was responsible? She informed them that it was
Yakubu Abubakar. He was summoned in my presence and informed about Safiyatu's
confession. He swore, “Safiyatu, by Allah, have you not known any other person apart
from me alone?” Safiyatu responded by saying that, “By Allah, I have never had
intercourse with anybody apart from you alone.” Then, the policemen inquired from
Yakubu the number of times he had intercourse with her. He retorted, “Three times.”
Safiyatu objected to this and said that it occurred four times. They both exchanged words
on whether it was three times or four times. The policemen concluded that the act was
carried out three times. This is my account on the matter. In agree with the police; it
occurred three times and not four times.46
The Court then proceeded to ask if Yakubu Abubakar, had objections or questions on the exhibit?
The first accused said that he heard all that was said but refused to agree with the witness because
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Ibid., p. 19.
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he did not see the prosecution’s witness (PW1) at the time the policemen accosted him. The Court
asked the prosecution witness if he had any proof to substantiate his presence at the time. He
insisted that the policemen there were witnesses to his testimony. After this, he was discharged by
the Court.47
The second prosecution witness (PW2), Attahiru Tungar Tudu, also swore to tell the truth and gave
his witness report:
What I, Attahiru, know in this matter is that the policeman, Ali, came to Tungar Tudu
together with his colleague. He inquired from me about the head of the village. I told him
that he was absent. He asked further for the deputy. I told him that I am the one. He then
requested that I take him to Safiyatu’s house. On reaching there, he sent for Safiyatu. He
told her they had an intelligence report that she got pregnant after her previous divorce. He
inquired of her to tell him who was responsible for her pregnancy. She reported that
Yakubu Abubakar was responsible for her pregnancy Yakubu was interrogated in my
presence. Ali informed him of Safiyatu's claim. When asked if it was true?” He kept quiet.
Ali repeated the question. Yakubu then spoke to Safiyatu saying: “By Allah, have you not
known any other man apart from me?” Safiyatu replied, “By Allah, you are the only man
that I know I had sex with.” From there on, the police interrogated Yakubu about the
number of times sexual union occurred. Safiyatu maintained it was four times, but Yakubu
maintained that it was three times. That is all that I know.48
The Court proceeded to ask Yakubu if he agreed with the witness’s report? He disagreed. He
alleged that Attahiru had close ties with Abdullahi, the brother to Safiyatu. The Court inquired
from PW2 if it is true that he is a friend to Abdullahi? PW2 said that Abdullahi is his in-law. He
also insisted that he is not Safiyatu’s brother nor neighbour.49
Both witnesses were released, and jurisprudence was adjourned to 14th August 2001. However,
the proceeding scheduled for 14 August 2001 was cut short because the primary witnesses, two
police officers responsible for the accused’s arrest, were on another duty outside Sokoto at the
time. The case was adjourned to 11 September 2001.
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On 11 September 2001, the Court sat. Both the accused persons were present, and the
prosecutors had the two police witnesses: the name of the third witness (PW3) is Aliyu Yusuf with
batch number 113724. He is a Muslim man and was 32years old. The name of the fourth witness
(PW4) is Joseph U.T. He is 38years old with the batch number 113600. Both men served under
the Area Commander’s Office Gwadabawa, Local Government.
The third prosecutor witness (Aliyu Yusuf) affirmed that he would tell the truth.
Below is a further excerpt of the proceedings:

The Court asked Aliyu about his knowledge of Safiyatu and Yakubu? He testified:
I know between Safiyatu and Yakubu that on 23/12/2000, we were told that one Yakubu
Abubakar had impregnated one Safiyatu Hussaini out of wedlock. The incident occurred
at Tungar Tudu Chimmola Gwadabawa Local Government. We informed our boss, the
Area Commander, who instructed us to go and investigate. We went, but the village head
was not around. However, his representative took us to the accused persons. During our
interrogation, Safiyatu confessed that indeed Yakubu Abubakar committed zinā with her
on four occasions. Nevertheless, Yakubu Abubakar denied ever committing zinā with her.
However, he said she is his cousin, and he used to joke with her. That is all that I know.50
The Court asked the 1st accused if he agreed with the report or wished to ask any questions.
Yakubu said that he heard the evidence and retorted that he accepted it. The Court further asked
the 2nd accused, Safiyatu Hussaini, if she heard the testimony and had any objections? She
submitted that, the testimony of the Aliyu is valid. She explained her position, insisting that she
had said that Yakubu had sexual relations with her in four different occasions, but Yakubu had
acknowledged that it happened three times. Thus, the testimony of Aliyu was false concerning
Yakubu.51
The Court further interrogated the fourth prosecutor witness, Joseph U.T. He stated:
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On 23rd December 2000 at about 2:00 p. m. Yakubu Abubakar was reported to have
impregnated Safiyatu Husseini. We were deployed to investigate the matter at Tungar
Tudu. While there, we interrogated Safiyatu who confessed that she was pregnant and that
Yakubu was responsible. Upon interrogating Yakubu on the matter, he refused
responsibility.52
After the reported evidence of the witness, Yakubu affirmed the testimony. Safiyatu, However,
said that she heard the evidence but refused to agree with it. She insisted that Joseph’s testimony
was false about Yakubu’s claims.
Concluding its investigations, the Court asked Yakubu Abubakar (the first accused) if he had
any other defense he wished to state before the Court’s judgment. He held that the police’s
evidence was true and correct when they stated that he never said that he committed zinā with her,
not even once. However, he insisted that the first witnesses were mischievous and did not agree
with their evidence. The same opportunity was given to the second accused, Safiyatu Hussaini.
She insisted that the police did not tell the truth and was persistent in claiming that Yakubu (the
first accused) impregnated her. The Court further inquired from Safiyatu for the duration she was
out of wedlock before she had sexual relations with Yakubu? She said it was for two years.
The court inquired from Safiyatu, if she had a “sleeping pregnancy”53 from her previous marriage
before committing adultery? She responded that she knew that Yakubu is responsible for her
pregnancy because at the time of her divorce, she had gotten a whole circle of her menses before
sexual activities between her and the accused.54
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Ibid.
This is the literal translation from Hausa language “Kwatacen ciki” (sleeping pregnancy) to mean “dormant
embryo”.
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I personally find this affirmation of Safiyatu interesting. I might be over reading into the matter but it is my
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be that she was not informed properly about the seriousness of such a crime and about the provision given in Maliki
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After this, the judge called on further witnesses. Alhaji Mode, a Muslim man, and Sarkin Fawa,
a Muslim, aged 75 years old, both declared that they were witnesses to the confession that Safiyatu
made before the Court.55
The judge of the Upper Shariʾa Court Gwadabawa proceeded to give his charge:
“I, Muhammadu Bello Sanyinnawal, do hereby charge you Yakubu Abubakar and you
Safiyatu Hussaini with the offense of zinā based on the complaint made against you by the
police, alleging that you committed zinā whereby you Safiyatu became pregnant and gave
birth to a baby girl when you are not married. I convict the accused of zinā as defined by
Section 128 of the Shariʾa Criminal Procedure Code Law 2000 of Sokoto State, which is
punishable under section 129(b). Its punishment is death by stoning with moderate size
stones.”56
The Court inquired from the accused if they understood the conviction? They both said that they
did not understand.
Given their response that they did not understand the charge against them, the charge was then
explained to them that the Court charges them with committing the offense of zinā. Moreover, if
they were found guilty, they would receive hadd punishments as prescribe by Maliki jurisprudence
because they were Muslims and both were once married. The accused persons both affirmed that
they understood the charge and understood what it meant.
The Court asked whether the accused persons had other objections? Yakubu stated in his
defense that he never engaged in sexual relations with Safiyatu. He insisted that the earlier
witnesses were her relations and wanted to ruin him. In her defense, Safiyatu stated that the
argument was not logical since she could not have impregnated herself. She insisted that Yakubu
was responsible for her pregnancy.57
In his judgment, Muhammadu Bello Sanyinnawal (judge of the Upper Shariʾa Court) explained
that according to Maliki jurisprudence, the testimony of two witnesses is not sufficient for
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conviction of zinā, and since Yakubu did not confess to committing the crime, he could be
acquitted. Substantiating his position, he relied on The Risala which states that the assigned
penalty of adultery is given to the individual who confesses to it, or on the proof of four witnesses,
or through the manifestation of pregnancy.58 He submitted that these criteria do not meet up in the
charge against Yakubu Abubakar. Therefore, he is acquitted of the crime. He noted that Yakubu’s
revocation of his earlier confession sets him free. In order to substantiate this position, he
quoted Mukhtasar where it says:
“The ḥadd punishment should be inflicted on the one who confesses to the commission
of zinā in all circumstances save where he later retracts such confession. Such retraction
should be accepted, and the ḥadd punishment would then not be inflicted.”59

However, Safiyatu Husseini was convicted for the crime of zina on account of the evidence of her
pregnancy. He substantiated his verdict using Mukhtasar Vol. 2. p. 285 where it states that adultery
is established based on pregnancy. Upon this fact, Safiyatu Hessaini was found guilty of zina.
However, her punishment was prolonged until she finishes to wean her baby.
Following the sentence, she brought before the Shariʾa Appeal Court her case for redress
which was heard in October 2001. The case file to the Shariʾa Court of Appeal Sokoto reads:
I, Safiyatu Hussaini T/Tudu, appeal against the Upper Shariʾa Court Gwadabawa in case
No. USC/GW/CR/TR/010/001 dated 9/10/01 wherein the Court sentenced me to rajm for
committing zinā.60
The appellant presented the following charges:
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1. The Lower court’s conviction is erroneous for it had built its case on that claims that Safiyatu
confessed to zinā where actually she had not.
2. The judgement of the previous court contravened the proper interpretation of Shariʾa in regards
to using the birth of a child as proof of adultery. She presented the following particulars to
substantiate her position. Firstly, that she is divorced; secondly, she was not divorced for more
than five years. Thirdly, she claimed that her spouse from the previous marriage was responsible
for her child birth in accordance to the principles of sleeping embryo.
3. Good comprehensive explanation was not provided her concerning the meaning of the offense
and its punishment.
4. The court had breached her rights to a fair hearing by not educating her on the possibility of her
getting a lawyer to represent her during the trial.61
5. The legitimacy of the court is called to fore since its establishment was after the date of her
pregnancy, that is on 23/12/2000. The penal codes came into effect a month later, 25/1/2001.
The four judges62 of the Shariʾa Appeal Court overturned the former judgement on 25th March
2002, overturned the death sentence. The judges noted that the Upper Shariʾa court’s conviction
on the grounds of Safiyatu’s confession is speculative and invalid. The only data available in the
trial records is that on 23rd December 2000, the police were informed that the accused committed
adultery and as a result, she became pregnant. Therefore, it is invalid to posit that Safiyatu
allegedly committed the offense. The Shariʾa Appeal Court accepted their argument accusing the
lower Shariʾa court of failing to explain zinā’s nature satisfactorily to the accused person. Sabulus

I had earlier observed that Safiyatu’s lack of access to a legal representative could possibly be a reason for her
poor understanding of the severity of the case and ignorance about the plea of a “sleeping embryo” provided in
Maliki jurisprudence.
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The Four judges concerned are: Hon. Muhammad Bello Silame (Grand Qadi), Hon. Muhammad Tambari Usman
(Qadi ), Hon. Abdulkadir Saidu Tambuwal (Qadi), Bello Muhammad Rabah (Qadi).
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Salam63and Al-Tashriʾu al-Jinaʾi64 were quoted to substantiate this point. The Court submitted that
from the trial court’s record of proceedings; in this case, it never asked the accused if she was sane
or not.
The Shariʾa Court of Appeal further went on to uphold the ground of appeal that the trial court
is in error by relying heavily on the evidence of pregnancy while Safiyatu was divorced. The
Appeal Court submitted that the Upper Shariʾa Court failed to understand that under Islamic law,
women can have gestation that last up to five years even after being divorced from her husband.
The appeal court substantiated this citing the Tuhfa, p. 47, which submits that the maximum for
gestation five years.65 However, the Shariʾa Appeal Court was unwilling to address the question
of the affiliation of the paternity of the child? The Court held that this is a new issue now being
raised; therefore, it is not within the Court’s jurisdiction to call for evidence to establish the truth
on the matter. This matter raises a shubha (a doubt) which is in itself sufficient grounds to remit
the ḥadd punishment sentenced by the Upper Shariʾa Court.66
Finally, Safiyatu Husseini was acquitted of the charges based on the illegitimacy of the lower
court to hear the case in the first place since her pregnancy occurred prior to the enactment of the
Shariʾa penal laws.
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2. 2. 2. Case Against Amina Lawal (Katsina State)
Amina Lawal (3? years and divorced) was charged with zinā on 15 January 2002 for giving birth
to a child when she was not married. A lower Shariʾa Court tried her in Bakori, Katsina State. A
single qadi constituted the court and consequently convicted her for the crime of zinā. According
to the Shariʾa court, her confession and testimony were enough pieces of proof to charge her with
the crime. The man alleged to be the baby’s father is Yahaya Abubakar. He denied his involvement
in the affair. Amina Lawal was not educated about her rights, such as the right to have contract
agreements with lawyers to oversee her defense. She was not informed about the severity of hadd
crime of zinā. She was convicted on the evidence of the birth of her child and that she had
confessed to crime.
Several lawyers took up her case, and it was lodged in the Upper Sharia court on 28 March
2002. However, the judges of the court (Alhaji Umar Ibrahim, Alhaji Bello Usman, Alhaji Aliyu
Abdullahi, and Alhaji Mamuda) upheld the death sentence on 19 August 2002. They insisted that
she could not retract her confession.
After this preceding, redress was filed to the Shariʾa Court of Appeal.
When the Katsina State Shariʾa Court of Appeal heard Amina’s appeal, it considered several
issues erred by previous courts on the matter:
1. Statutory composition of the Court that tried Amina at first instance (that is the lower
Shariʾa Court).
2. The gestation period for fertilized embryos.
3. Circumstances and methods of apprehension of alleged offender(s).
4. Violations on Shariʾa principle for the right of retraction of confession.
Eventually, the Katsina State Shariʾa Court of Appeal acquitted Amina Lawal on these grounds:
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Firstly, concerning the statutory composition of the Court of the first instance, one judge
was present during Amina Lawal’s initial conviction instead of the two judges required under
Islamic Law.67 Therefore, the Court was not properly constituted. Secondly, under a proper
interpretation of Shariʾa law, gestation period for pregnancy can last for up to five years, therefore,
creating the possibility to assign paternity of the baby to the previous husband.68 From the
preceding, it would appear that the second reason touched on substantive law. It states that embryos
could be in gestation for periods of up to five years with the consequence that a previous husband
is liable to accept paternity of a child born due to this pregnancy unless he refutes by swearing the
oath of li’an (Curse).69 The Shariʾa Court of Appeal observed that substantive Maliki Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh) would have been satisfactorily applied and implemented to acquit Amina
Lawal by the previous courts. Thirdly, the Court submitted that the policeman who first arrested
Amina in 2002 violated Islamic law requiring four witnesses to the crime. This requirement was
not met before her arrest. Fourthly, the Court held that Maliki jurisprudence allowed for the
possibility of accused persons to retract their testimonies at any point prior to final ruling. The
court insisted on this by taking the example of the Holy Prophet who rejected Maʾiz’s claims of
zinā on several occasions. He would not accept his confession not after inquiring and establishing
the sanity of Maʾiz during the time of his first confession. Therefore, the Qadis of the Appeal
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Getting data on the prevalence of the use of liʾan during post-Colonial Northern Nigeria would have enriched our
paper. However, I found no materials on the matter. Such a field interest will make for good contributions to the
study of shariʾa principles used in zinā related issues in Nigeria.
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Shariʾa Court submitted: No Shariʾa court of law could convict anyone based on the narrative of
a single confession, and without establishing the mental state of the individual.
The Shariʾa Appeal Court found that the Shariʾa lower court, Bakori, convicted the
appellant based on a single confession before the Court. The Shariʾa Appeal Court, therefore,
overturned the initial judgement. The judges submitted that the previous court had contravened
Shariʾa’s provision for retraction of confessions. They referred to the Hadith of Maʾiz70.
The State Shariʾa Court of Appeal, on 25 September 2003, abrogated the death sentence on
Amina Lawal. The lead judgment led by Hon. Grand Khadi A. I. Katsina, and three other judges
(Hon. Qadi I.M. Umar, Hon. Khadi S. M. Daura, Hon. S. M. Dan-Musa) submitted that the case
had insufficient evidences to sentence Amina Lawal. They also submitted that it was within her
rights to withdraw the previous confession. However, there was the minority report by Hon. Qadi
Sule Sada Kofar Sauri who did not agree.71
2. 3.

Consideration for the Question of Who is eligible to bring Charges of Zinā
We observed that in the zinā cases treated above, the police brought both Safiyatu and

Amina. In both cases, upon receiving information from unspecified persons about both women
becoming pregnant out of marriage, the local police went into investigation and brought charges
of zinā against the men and women. Is the police force a proper agent to bring zinā charges?
The Sharia Criminal Procedure Codes, 2000, (CPC) used by the 12 Sharia States has no
provisions for defining this matter. Its precedent CPC, 1960, provided limited categories of persons
permissible to bring charges of zinā: In the case of married persons, the husband of the woman, or

In this Hadith, the Prophet was angry at his associates for denying Maʾiz the opportunity to retract his confession
when he requested to be taken back to Prophet.
71
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an adult in charge of her in his absence, are the principal agents to bring such charges when it
occurs to the Court. In the case of an unmarried girl, complaints should be made by her father or
another adult in charge of her.72 Unfortunately, this omission empowers the police to bring
charges of zinā before Sharia courts. Evidently, this is the reason why the police charged both
Saffiyatu and Amina.
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Cf. Criminal Procedure Code (1960), section 142.
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Chapter Three
3. 0

Procedural and Substantive Evaluations of Zinā Cases to Ascertain Areas Bothering

on Women’ Human Rights Issues
Introduction: During the juridical processes of the convictions of Safiya Husseini and Amina
Lawal Zinā (adultery) cases and their eventual acquittal by the upper Sharia courts, observers
identify indices indicating that some aspects of Shari’a were biased and prejudiced against women.
There are scores of pieces of literature highlighting the perceived Shari’a gender bias against
women. For instance, Hauwa Ibrahim, a counsel in the defense team of Amina Lawal, submits that
she considered her work as a gender-specific assignment.73 Her published reflections after
Amina’s acquittal illustrate how much pressure she said she was under while challenging what she
considers a gender bias in the adjudication of sexual offenses under Islamic law.74
The fact that the Shari’a judicial system adopted in Nigeria75, in its attempts to be close to
the spirit of Shariʾa (Shariʾa provides protection and dignity of every human being, and seeks to
elicit for repentance and conversion rather than punitive actions) adopted a three strata Shariʾa
court system, is neglected. The courts are the Lower or Local Shariʾa courts, the Upper Shariʾa
court, and the Shariʾa Appeal court. In an ascending order, these courts help to re-evaluate cases
and ensure that fiqh and the interpretation and application of Shariʾa are appropriately applied to
individual cases to best bring about justice in every case brought before them.
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Amina and Safiyyatu were both charged for the offense of zina. The pieces of evidences
used for their convictions was the fact that they were found pregnant and gave birth their children
when they were not in any form of marriage. When their cases were referred to the Shariʾa Appeal
Courts of Katsina and Sokoto states, respectively, judgments of the lower Shariʾa courts which
was hinged on the position that unmarried pregnancy is proof of zinā by itself was overturned.
Both Appeal courts held that the case of pregnancy in an unmarried state is not ipso facto
justification of adultery. The judges also spotted out jeopardized procedures of fiqh in the lower
courts.
The Courts of Appeal did their utmost to examine the cases repeatedly and present the
accused with provisions within the law to circumvent the hadd. The Shariʾa Court of Appeal
checked the errors of fiqh by the lower courts and eventually provided conviction for the accused.
It did this by meticulously and wholistically applying Qurʾanic contexts and examples from sunna
in leaving doors for repentance and acquittal, especially for women.
Uniquely, Judges of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts employed substantial and procedural
requirements to promote a spirit that upholds human dignity and promotes repentance, mercy, and
justice. Analyzing the decisions of the Appeal courts fiqh stances regarding evidences for zina, it
is safe to submit that the Courts of Appeal have laid down admirable exemplar in these matters.
In our considerations on the amount of gender-centric concerns which the Safiya Husseini
and Amina Lawal zinā cases generated, this chapter shall evaluate through the lenses of both the
procedural and substantial contents used for convictions and acquittal in zinā cases and as used by
the three statuses of Shariʾ a Courts: The lower Shariʾa courts (which sometimes may be the Upper
Shariʾa courts) and the Shariʾa Court of Appeal. We do this to establish areas of Women’s rights
concerns that the lower courts propagated and illustrate how and where the Shariʾa resolves these
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issues, especially by the Shariʾ a Court of Appeal. In other words, there is a built-in mechanism to
help check for abuses, grey concerns, and issues of human rights concerns ingrained in the Shariʾa
application.
3. 1.

Arguments for Women Gender Bias in Zinā Cases
A specific perceived bearing on gender bias against women in the zinā cases studied in this

research is the discharge of their male accomplices in the alleged crimes. In both cases, the men
involved simply accused Sufiyatu and Amina of impugning (qadhf) their integrity. Yakubu, the
alleged man responsible for committing zinā with Sufiyatu had two witnesses who corroborated
that he had confessed to having committed zinā. Nevertheless, this was insufficient proof for
conviction since the testimony of four adult persons is needed. A similar situation arises in the
dismissal of Yahaya Abubakar, the alleged accomplice in Amina Lawal’s case. He was acquitted
simply on denial of being involved in the matter since the provision for four witnesses
corroborating his involvement in the case was not met.
This “seeming” ease of acquittal of men in zinā related matters irks pain in women
considerations. Getting four corroborating witnesses for the offense of adultery is the primary
condition for accused men. In contrast to women cases, evidence such as pregnancy and the birth
of a child are also used to establish the crime of zinā. While it is improbable to have accused
persons (both male and female) convicted of zinā based on the requirement of four witnesses, this
is not so for convicting women of zinā. Pregnancy could be a prima facie ground for proof and
possible conviction. The evidence via pregnancy is the condition most women easily fall into.
In addition, there is a lop-sided issue for women with regards to the four-witness
requirement.76 In the absence of four witnesses, the denial of an alleged man (or male) accomplices
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It is imperative to note here that that four-witness rule is a safe measure to guarantee the strongest possible direct
evidence before any allegations might be made against a woman’s chastity.
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in cases of zinā consequentially put the accused women within the crime of defamation (qadhf).
For instance, the fact that Yahaya Abubakar had maintained that he never made a confession to
the crime of zinā meant that a second charge of qadhf (that is, a charge for defaming) of his
character is added to her zinā case.
These concerns continue to provide reasons for complaints about the treatment of women
in zinā related cases by the new Shariʾa criminal and penal laws in Nigeria. The new Shari’a Penal
Codes have produced such heightened public debates and involvements of some Nigerian Civil
Society organizations and non-governmental groups such as the BAOBAB for Women’s Human
Rights, who have been very involved in these matters.77
In both cases, the provision of four witnesses, or lack of this, to corroborate an alleged crime
of zinā was highly considered. Safiyya Husseini and Yakubu Abubakar on 23 December, 2000
were arrested and trialed for zinā at the Upper Shariʾa Court in Gwadabawa, Sokoto State. They
were charged to Court under the new Shariʾa Penal Codes. Yakubu Abubakar was released for
denying the charge for lack of the required evidence of four witnesses. According to Muhammadu
Bello Sanyinnawal, (Grand judge of the Upper Shariʾa Court), having two witnesses who affirmed
Yakubu’s confession to committing zinā is not satisfactory evidence. The offense of zinā, in this
case, needs to be proved by the evidence of four witnesses. However, Safiyatu Husseini was judged
guilty of zinā because of her pregnancy and eventual birth. She was given the hadd punishment of
rajm.
Amina Lawal was jointly charged alongside Yahaya Mohammed for illicit sexual relations
together in the cause of their relationship. She eventually got pregnant and was delivered of her
baby. The case was first heard on 15 January 2002. After swearing an oath with the Qurʾan, Yahaya
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Mohammed was set free. On the exhibit of child birth, the local Shariʾa court charged Amina
Lawal with the offense of adultery. An appeal lodged on 28 March 2002 with the Upper Shariʾa
Court in Funtua did not revert any decisions but upheld the death sentence on 19 August 2002.
Could there be some procedural and substantive considerations in these matters of
jurisprudence that could help isolate areas of gender bias issues in both cases?
3. 2.

Some Procedural and Substantial Considerations of Safiyatu Husseini’s and Amina

Lawal’s Conviction in the Lower Shariʾa Courts
Firstly, we shall look into the procedural circumstances around Safiyatu Husseini’s case in
the lower Court (in this case, the Upper Shariʾa Court, since this was the first Court of instance
used for her trial) which convicted her of zinā.
We do this in order to ascertain areas where judicial litigation, according to the
Maliki madhāb, may have been bridged. This helps us to focus on possible grey areas in women
bias concerns.
3. 2. 1. Procedures Around Apprehension of the Accused:
The police apprehended the accused (Safiyatu Husseini and Yakubu Abubakar) upon reports
made to them by anonymous persons. She was apprehended without the evidence of four witnesses
to the alleged crime of zinā. According to the record of the trial court proceedings held on
23/12/2000, it is stated that at about 2 p.m., the police were informed about the case of zinā between
Safiyatu Hussaini and Yakubu Abubakar. No information is garnered about specifications of the
place or time that the accused allegedly carried out the offense. In order words, the apprehension
of the accused goes contrary to Shariʾa’s requirements.
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3. 2. 2. Procedures in Establishing status of Mohsan78:
Al-Tashriʾu al-Jinaʾi79 states that confession to the crime of adultery is not sufficient prove
for passing hadd. He adds that it is necessary for judges to ascertain the state of sanity of such
confessors in order to give value to their confession. This is done by asking the following of the
accused: What is zinā? How is it done? To whom and with whom is it done? The judge is expected
to ascertain if the accused is a Mohsan or not? In situations where the accused claims to
be Mohsan, it is obligatory for the judge to interrogate further by asking, “What is ihsan80 in
Shariʾa?” He emphasizes that even when the judge establishes sanity of the accused, he is advised
to inquire further from the accused: What zinā is? How is it committed? To whom
is zinā committed? Where these questions are satisfactorily answered, they must inquire further,
“Are you a Mohsan? or not?” If the purported declares that he is Mohsan, the qadi should querry
him, “What is Ihsan in Shariʾa?”81
The repetitive series of questions are meant to help guarantee proper understanding and
appreciation for the gravity of the crime of zinā from the accused. It is also done to give room for
providing proper counsel where there might be some misunderstanding in order to ensure justice
for the accused person(s).
In the documents of the lower Shariʾa court proceedings that tried Safiyatu, the meticulous
procedures for ascertaining and establishing a proper understanding of the accused regarding the
gravity of the crime, her faith, and willful consent to the matter was not followed.
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A man (or mohsinat, woman) who is in the state of ihsan
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3. 2. 3. Unsatisfactory Reliance on Pregnancy:
Safiyatu presented the following particulars to substantiate her position to the Upper Sharia
Court. Firstly, that she is divorced; secondly, she was not divorced for more than five years.
Thirdly, she averred that paternity of her child lies her former husband under the Maliki fiqh.
Despite these particulars presented, the Upper Shariʾa Court convicted Safiyatu of the offense
of zinā. She was sentenced to rajm because of her pregnancy and eventual birth of a child while
she was not married. This does wrong according to Maliki fiqh.
Secondly, we shall consider the procedural and substantive matters that ensued during
Amina’s conviction in the lower Shariʾa Courts. The litigation process that manifested throughout
Amina Lawal’s trial will help isolate areas that could lend themselves to interpretation as genderbiased against women.
3. 3.

Substantive and Procedural Considerations Around Amina Lawal’s Conviction in the

Lower Shariʾa Courts
Amina admittedly submitted that she had sexual intercourse with Yahaya. On his path, he
denied it. The Court set him free on this account and on the inability to present four witnesses to
the crime. Amina however was found guilty based on the evidence of her pregnancy out of
wedlock.
3. 3. 1. Inadmissibility of Retraction as means for conviction:
Confession to the crime of zinā is one of the requirements that could be used for judgement and
exercise of the ḥadd penalties. It is required that the individual confessing must be an adult and in
full and complete mental health. In this situation, one confession (Iqrar) is often sufficient to
convict82, but the confessor may be persuaded to withdraw such confession in any way whatsoever
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(mutlaqan) or even run away during the implementation of the ḥad punishment.83 Withdrawal of
the confession is acceptable on its own and will lead to acquittal. However, some Maliki jurists
have maintained that for the retraction to help a defendant, it ought to go along with arguments or
facts that could amount to some doubt (shubhah).84 Malik is reported to have said:
As for an individual who confesses committing fornication and then says, they did not do
so and said it was for certain reasons, that it would be accepted from him and he will not
be punished because this punishment is for Allah, it (conviction) cannot be done without
either vivid proof on whosoever does so, or by his confession.85
In the case of Amina Lawal, she had confessed to the crime of zinā with Yahayya in the Local
Shariʾa court, Bakori. However, since the required four witnesses needed to convict them were not
met, Yahayya simply denied the charges against him and accused Amina of defaming (qadhf) his
name. He was released. Amina was convicted of zinā based on her confession, but also on account
of her pregnancy and eventual birth of her daughter (who was delivered outside of marriage) and
of the crime of defamation (qadhf). Hoping for redress, she applied for a second judgment on the
matter in the Upper Shariʾa court in Funtua. In the bid to unwrap herself from the charges of qadhf,
she retracted her claims about Yahayya and appealed that her pregnancy and the birth of her baby
were a result of her previous marriage. In order words, she appealed to the argument of “sleeping
embryo.” The judges of the Upper Shariʾa court ruled in favour of the Local Shariʾa court in

fiqh ala ‘l-Madhahib al-Arba’, Vol 5 75, 94 and passim; M. Abu Hassaan, Ahkam al-Jareemah wa ‘l-Uqoobah fi ‘lShariah al-Islamiyyah 255-257; Ibn Hazm, Al-Muhalla, Vol II, 155-157
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submitting that her initial confession stood as proof for conviction and insisted that she could not
retract.
3. 3. 2. Abnormalities in Interpretation of Gestation Period for Fertilized Embryos:
Amina Lawal appealed to the Maliki jurisprudence on the matter of the duration of gestation,
which could be up to five years, thereby creating the possibility for the former spouse to be the
responsible.86 In cases of a divorced woman, whose husband has died and found to be with child,
or has a child without first remarrying, Maliki law holds that the pregnancy and child belong to
the divorced husband or deceased spouse. Unless if he is willing to go through the process
of Liʾan.87
This Maliki position is explained thus:
And if the woman gives birth to a child after (the waiting period) before the expiry of the
full gestation for pregnancy it is attached to the (former/dead) husband unless the husband
(if still alive) rejects it with the oath of Li’an.88
The quotation above emphasizes that in situations where the divorced woman is found to be
pregnant or with child within the gestation period (five years following Maliki jurisprudence) by
ipso facto, paternity is linked to the previous husband. This position is challenged if takes a li’an.
Amina’s former husband did not repudiate the pregnancy or child through Li’an, a provision
provided in such matters.89 Yet, the judges upheld the judgments passed by the lower Shariʾa court,
Bakori, insisting that her pregnancy and her daughter’s eventual birth were a result of zinā.
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Certain aspects of abnormalities give weight to the gender issue concerns of women from
the various procedural and substantial contents examined from the lower Shariʾ a Court’s handling
of both Safiyatu and Amina zinā cases. In both zinā cases, the women were unable to get off the
accusation of zinā on account of their pregnancies. Their male counterparts were released for lack
of four witnesses to corroborate the claims of zinā with these women.
Safiyatu and Amina were caught up in the second crime of qadhf. In order to rectify this problem,
they both pleaded for a Sleeping embryo. In doing so, their pregnancies would no longer be used
as pieces of evidence for the crime of zinā, for their husbands from prior marriages would be
responsible for their pregnancies. This legal principle within the Maliki jurisprudence was denied.
Worst still was that the lower Shariʾa Courts denied the women the possibility of retracting their
first confession about committing zinā.
3. 3. 3. Statutory composition of the Court that tried Amina at first instance:
The lower Shariʾa Court of Bakori where Amina Lawal was first tried and found guilty for
zinā, was led by a single judge. This is a practice that is contrary to an adequately constituted
Shariʾa court in accordance with the Katsina State Law.90 The statutory standard for legal Shariʾa
Court was not properly constituted because one judge was present during Lawal’s initial conviction
instead of the two required under Islamic Law.

3. 3. 4. Method of apprehension of alleged offender(s):
Maliki jurisprudence requires four male witnesses who saw the act occur for proof of zinā by
evidence.91 Proof should be jointly or consecutively taken within short intervals.92 However, the
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policeman who first arrested Amina in 2002 did so in violation of Islamic law, which requires four
witnesses to the crime.
Conclusively, it is logical to submit from the derivation of procedural and substantive issues
(concerning women's gender biases in zinā matters) highlighted from the lower Shariʾa Courts
above that there are plausible concerns. However, we also observe that most of these concerns do
not necessarily stem from Shariʾa itself, but from abuses of procedural systems and the lack of
proper interpretation and application of the contents and spirit of Shariʾa and the principles of
Maliki madhāb in these cases.
In response to these concerns, the Shariʾa Court of Appeal addressed both zinā case studies.
Therefore, within the submissions of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts, we can adequately understand and
deduce the position of Shariʾa with regards to women's gender concerns around the crime of zinā.
3. 4.

The Grounds for Acquittal of Amina Lawal and Safiyatu Husseini by the Shariʾa

Courts of Appeal
The conditions under which Amina Lawal and Safiyatu Husseini triumphed are founded
on substantive and procedural applications wrongly applied by the Shariʾa lower courts. Shariʾa
has the means to defend justice by inherent qualities within fiqh. For this reason, upon hearing
Amina Lawal’s, and Safiyattu Husseini’s appeals, the Shariʾa Court of Appeal in Katsina and
Sokoto identified the following errors:
1. The statutory composition of the Court that tried Amina Lawal at first instance (that is, in
the lower Shariʾa Court) was wrongly constituted.
2. The lower courts contravened the proper application for the argument of the gestation
period for fertilized embryos in the cases of Amina Lawal and Safiyatu Husseini.
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3. Circumstances and methods of apprehension of alleged offender(s) were contrary to Sharia
submissions in both cases.
4. There were violations of the Shariʾa principle for the right of retraction of confession in
the case against Amina Lawal.
Therefore, the Shariʾa courts of Appeal of both Katsina State and Sokoto acquitted both Amina
Lawal and Safiyatu Husseini of the charges of zinā, respectively.
“What primarily constitutes women-gender discrimination in zinā issues considered
above?” “Is this hinged more on substantive or procedural matters?” We observe that
the Shariʾa Courts of Appeal corrected the procedures followed by the lower courts and their
detailed interpretation of the evidence of pregnancy in both cases.
Three issues are pertinent for our consideration of gender bias against women in zinā cases.
First, insistence and predication of prosecution on the evidence of gestation as proof of adultery;
second, the absence of an accomplice in charge of zinā due to an initial discharge of the coaccused; and third, the presumption that women are denied access to justice under Islamic law.
The question of gender biases against Safiyatu Husseini and Amina Lawal depended on
pregnancy as a means of evidence in the absence of four witnesses. Pregnancy (a substantive
element) was used in both cases for proof and conviction of zinā. The men were acquitted of their
charges for the lack of four witnesses in both cases; whereas the women were found guilty by
evidence of pregnancy. These women were found guilty based on circumstantial or substantive
reasons.
3. 5.

Circumstantial concerns of pregnancy as the Crux of Women Gender Bias Argument
The main argument proposed is that the standards of evidence used for women in zinā

related cases is higher and different from the standards required of men. Pregnancy as prima
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facie evidence that could support a charge of zinā against a woman applies only to women. A man
cannot get pregnant. He cannot be charged for zinā on the evidence of a pregnancy, even where
the woman claims the man is responsible. It will be thought unjust the application of Shariʾa to the
crime of zinā as practiced in Nigeria, where the pregnancy was used solely as a basis for the
prosecution of the offense. For zinā to occur, there must be two persons, a male, and a female,
since the female who eventually becomes pregnant cannot be said to be the single architect of her
pregnancy. This argument applies to the consideration of non-consensual sex (rape) cases too.
Logically, it follows that convicting a woman of zinā in the absence of a male accomplice goes
logically and biologically against the act itself.
We will examine further the Court’s consideration on the matter of male accomplices in the
matter of zinā.
3. 5. 1. Women Gender consideration in the absence of Male accomplices in the Offence
of Zinā
Amina Lawal’s purported accomplice, Yahayya, was not charged and prosecuted beyond the Court
of the first instance because he said he did not have illegal sexual intercourse with Amina. 93 The
way and manner in which Yahayya was discharged and acquitted were frowned at by the Katsina
State Shari’a Court of Appeal. The lower Shari’a Court had only asked Yahayya to swear to an
oath, supposedly, an oath of suspicion. In its reaction to the oath taken, the Katsina State Court of
Appeal submitted:

No authority says that a person accused of zinā should take an oath in the absence of
evidence. The Shari’a Court Bakori erred when it administered the oath of suspicion on
Yahaya Mohammed. It is wrong to administer the oath.94
93
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The Court explained that in the absence of evidences such as the testimony of four witnesses, or
pregnancy, or confession to the crime, or pregnancy, the conviction for zinā is not confirmed. In
other words, no single piece of evidence from the three proofs of shreds of evidence stated above
is sufficient for the legal charge of a case of the crime of zinā in the first place. In the absence of
this evidence, the accusers (police) and their informants should receive punishment
for qadhf. ‘Therefore, it was wrong to administer an oath in this case.’95 Conclusively, the
absence of any male accomplice in the offense of zinā is not enough reason for arguments
indicative of women's gender bias in zinā cases.
Furthermore, to insist that an accused person (in this case, the male accomplice) for the
crime of Zina, who has also availed himself for defense under the law, should necessarily be
charged because biologically, there must necessarily be a male participant for zinā to occur, goes
contrary to the purpose of Shariʾa “presumption of innocence” before proven guilty. Such an
argument loses the motive behind the spirit of Shariʾa. The fact that zinā offense necessarily needs
a male accomplice does not mean that every accused male in a case is guilty.
3. 5. 2. Considerations for Cases of Non-Consensual Sex (Rape) in Zinā
Safiyatu had submitted that Yakubu raped her and she gave a vivid description of what happened.96
Rape is an inclusive content used in fiqh considerations around adultery claims.
Shariʾa fiqh already has arguments for defense against a charge of zinā for a woman’s pregnancy
due to non-consensual sex outside marriage. One of the ways to do this is to claim that she was
raped. According to Imam Malik:
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The established practice with us concerning the woman who is pregnant and without a
husband, who claims that ‘I was raped’ or ‘I got married’ is that these defenses will not be
admissible. The ḥad penalty will be applied upon her except she can advance evidence to
support her claim of marriage or rape, such as her turning up bleeding if she is a virgin, or
screaming until she is found defiled or similar corroborative evidence that establishes her
claim of her defilement.97
Thus, Malik has acknowledged the chance that pregnancy can occur from rape. Therefore, setting
up several standards to preserve rape victims from hadd penalty of zinā. Fiqh principal safeguards
physical evidence as undeniable proof of rape.98 Another measure is establishing the timeframe
within which the matter is reported.99 The character of the alleged rapist is to be examined,100 and
that of the woman making the allegation too.101
In an event, for instance, where the man alleged to have committed the rape is witnessed by
people when he forces himself on his victim, such a case is treated differently,102 and presumption
is established to support the woman’s plea of rape automatically. This was not the case with
Sufiyatu Husseini. Even though she alluded to the fact that Yakubu Abubakar raped her, her claims
could not be corroborated by witnesses, nor were there any bad cases of both accused called to
question before this event. Evidence such as bleeding could not be verified since she was not a
virgin. She had been divorced two years before her first sexual encounter with Yakubu. The Court
had to deal with the matter as an accusation of zinā between two adults regardless.
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There is the proposition that an unmarried woman, including divorced women, should not
be charged with adultery in the first place.103 This presumption appears to be predicated on the
reasoning that since sexual intercourse is intrinsically a regular human activity, there are no
rational bases for “criminalizing” the act amongst consenting adults. This is especially important
where the alleged persons have already acquired a taste for the act. This taste, the argument would
continue, having been imbibed as it were, within the legal marital relationship before these
marriages were legally broken, the estranged spouse(s) should not be burdened by any guilt of zinā.
Therefore, the Shariʾa courts had no case to treat in the first place, nor the jurisprudence in this
affair. This argument is inconsistent with Islamic law.
All schools of Islamic jurisprudence qualify for extra-marital sexual relations resulting in
intercourse

as

either

fornication

or zinā.

Though

both

are

implied

in

the Quranic prescription,104 hadith law establishes a distinction between the illegal sexual
activities of a married person and that of an unmarried person. In the evidential rules for proof of
the offense and whether the penalty upon conviction is appropriate and fair, scholars of the various
schools of Islamic law and even scholars within the same School of Islamic law have continued to
engage.
The prosecution team, in the Amina Lawal zinā case built its arguments on
the Quranic prescription for illegal extra-marital consensual sex and the codification of the offense
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in the Katsina State Shari’a Penal Code Law. The Qur’an, says: “Nor come close to zina, for it is
a shameful and an evil act, opening the way to other evils.”105
In his commentary on this verse, Abdullah Yusuf Ali maintains that:
Adultery is not only shameful, but it opens the road to other evils. It destroys the family's
foundation; it works against the interests of children born or to be given birth to; it may
cause murders and fights and the loss of one's reputation and belongings and weaken the
associations of society.106
Ibn Kathir’s commentary on the same verse is also illuminating. According to the exegete, he
posits that Allah forbids adherents to participate in adultery, nor desire and carry out actions that
could lead towards it.107
He then proceeds to state:

Imam Ahmad recorded Abu Umamah saying that a young man came to the Prophet and
said, “O Messenger of Allah! Permit me to commit zinā.” The people surrounded him and
rebuked him, saying, “Stop! Stop!” But the Prophet said, (Come close). The young man
came to him, and he said, (Sit down) so he sat down. The Prophet said, (Would you like it
(unlawful sex) for your mother) He said, “No, by Allah, may I be ransomed for you.” The
Prophet said, (Neither do the people like it for their mothers.) The Prophet said, (Would
you like it for your daughter) He said, “No, by Allah, may I be ransomed for you.” The
Prophet said, (Neither do the people like it for their daughters.) The Prophet said, (Would
you like it for your sister) He said, “No, by Allah, may I be ransomed for you.” The Prophet
said, (Neither do the people like it for their sisters.) The Prophet said, (Would you like it
for your paternal aunt) He said, “No, by Allah, O Allah’s Messenger! May I be ransomed
for you.” The Prophet said, (Neither do the people like it for their paternal aunts.) The
Prophet said, (Would you like it for your maternal aunt) He said, “No, by Allah, O Allah’s
Messenger! May I be ransomed for you.” The Prophet said, (Neither do the people like it
for their maternal aunts).108
The Qur’anic exegeses on the subject of zinā (adultery) are pretty extensive. They conclude that
the prescribed punishment for the offense is a deterrent. However, the crime is still being
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committed, and interaction and living in a community with non-muslims who do not criminalize
adultery has opened up avenues of criticism of the Islamic legal system in this respect. More so
when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has pitched its system of purportedly nonreligious human rights schemes against Islamic Human Rights Schemes throughout the world.109
Another circumstantial concern in regards to zinā and women gender issues is the complaint
about access to justice
3. 6.

A proposition that women are denied access to justice under Islamic law
Various claims that women and the poor are at the receiving margins of the fiqh justice

system because they lack the wherewithal to access justice and that ‘the zinā laws are far more
difficult for uneducated and poor women to counter’110 only reflects the inherent contradictions
within all modern legal systems. No modern legal system has perceptible ready-made inbuilt
mechanisms that ensure all persons have equal and unfettered access to justice. To claim that such
a system really will be further from the truth.
There are established courts and procedures to be followed in all legal systems to institute
and maintain causes. Almost all judicial systems provide for an education process that ensures that
practitioners receive some legal training to participate in the system. Today, legal representation
is sine-quo-non to access to justice. It is presumed that only those who are knowledgeable in the
workings of the judiciary and the judicial system can speak comprehensively of the law and
represent the interest of the plaintiff. This is no different from Shariʾa court systems.
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The Islamic legal system admits of legal representation and places the obligation on judges of
Sharia courts to guide litigants where they have no legal advisers.
Contrary to the position that women lack the resources to have proper representation
in shariʾa court cases and therefore cannot gain justice for their causes in zinā related cases is
negated by the final investigation and rulings of the shariʾa Appeal courts in the cases of Amina
Lawal and Sufiyattu Husseini.
This is proof in itself that despite the sentences passed by the Shariʾa lower courts, both
women sought for acquittal in the Shariʾa legal system of the Appeal courts. According to her
counsel, Aliyu Musa Yawuri, he said that she is a Muslim and believes that the Shariʾa, under
which she was convicted, should have mechanism to allow her appeal the ruling of the lower Court,
thereby guaranteeing the attainment of justice.
The entire processes of trials and convictions, the appeals, and acquittal of Amina Lawal
and Safiyattu Husseini off the charges of zinā by the State Shari’a Appeal Courts demonstrate that
the Shariʾa Penal Codes (2000) are not gender biased.
3. 7

Some General Remarks
The restoration of zinā laws has been met with lots of pushback. This is due to the

presumptive gender biases drawn from lower shariʾa court misplaced interpretation and
applications of Maliki opinions in Safiyatu Husseini and Amina Lawal cases. Where in, the men
were simply acquitted of zinā based on the fact that the required number of witnesses was
unattainable. On the other hand, pregnancy was used as evidence against the women.
Contrary to this position, it is important to state that shariʾa promotes the egalitarian right
to both male and female defendants in zinā cases. The presumption of innocence for defendants is
at the core of shariʾa. The presumption of innocence and not reserved for men alone but for women
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inclusively. The use of pregnancy as evidence is limited to Maliki jurisprudence. However, Maliki
jurisprudence requires that other considerations such as the gestation period of pregnancy are
associated with the use of pregnancy as prima facie evidence. This is done to reduce the threshold
for finding any woman guilty of zinā. The principle of doubt (shubha) is another threshold used
for preventing the punishment of stoninig (rajm). Doubt is attained through confession of rape
(unwilful participation of the woman). Where doubt in a hudūd crime is ascertained, the
punishment of rajm is not applied. Consequently, it could be evidently claimed that the
interpretation and application of Shariʾa jurisprudence, according to Maliki's opinion in the lower
Shariʾa courts, were poor and reductionist in approach.
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Chapter Four
4. 0

Plausible Recommendations for Areas of Reform

Introduction: This chapter challenges the proposition that Shariʾa penal laws are incompatible
with international human rights. In refuting the position that Shariʾa penal codes are not dynamic,
this chapter shall build on the notions of “principles and objectives” behind the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and those of the Shariʾa ideology maslaha and maqasid
al-shariʾa. Furthermore, it shall demonstrate the sense in which the Shariʾa Appeal Courts in
Nigeria being saddled with the responsibility of safeguarding Shariʾa from a reductionist approach
which the lower shariʾa courts applied, to a holistic consideration of the law, therefore
demonstrating Shariʾa shared value with the international standard of human rights. It is within
the multi-valued and teleological ends of Shariʾa that its dynamic nature is applied. The
considerations of the rulings of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts demonstrate the bridge
between Shariʾa and international Human rights norms for all human rights, especially in as it
relates to zinā cases with regards to women's rights. Pedagogical shot to accomodate Shariʾa rules
with international norms are confused for misguided trials to simply subjugate Shariʾa to
international standards. Ours attempts to identify and advance the objectives of theses subject
matters (that is of both UDHR and Shariʾa) and provide a scientific and moral satisfactory leverage
of complementarity between the two systems.
Conclusively, our research proposes that the Shariʾa Courts of Appeal rulings could be set
as a benchmark forum for further evaluative projects of the Shariʾa criminal and penal codes
procedures. Adhering to such reforms will follow the legacy of the Shariʾa committee of 19581962, which was set at bridging Shariʾa law in the penal code of 1960 with human rights concerns.
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The 1999 Shariʾa committee failed to meet this salient mark already discussed (confer chapter I
for discussion).

4. 1.

A Background Consideration of the New Sharia Penal Code
It took about six months to study and implement the Shariʾa Penal Code and Criminal

Procedure 2000. It was quickly and incompletely rushed. These flaws in the legislation are caused
by the limited time used during the formation of the work. Another possible factor contributing to
the disorganized composition of the codes was the apprehension that they were of lesser
significance. They are simply tools for establishing Shari’a and only useful for consultations in
cases of silence or ambiguity of the enacted law. Codes were not introduced with an explanatory
memorandum for the choices and provisions. They all seem to have been prepared in haste. The
hasty procedure explicates the substandard quality of codes and constant incorrect wordings.

4. 2.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
Several atrocities against humanity from the two world wars necessitated reformed

conceptions of human rights not limited to Western objectives111, but one that hopefully adopts
international objective as collective responsiveness to crimes of concern to the world. Sets of
constitutive norms to emphasize inviolable human rights founded on moral standards were reached
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 articulate.112 Attaining an
international agreement was imperative for the legitimacy of the universal human rights

In the article, “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy”, Padgen writes: “It departs from a
Western model of political rights held by persons under their citizenship in a specific territory or country.” A
popular notion during the European colonial expansion. He avers that this form of ideology “became increasingly
useless as a notion in international or intercultural relations.” Cf. Pagden Anthony, Political Theory 31, no. 2 (April
2003): 190.
112
Johannes Morsink explains that the declarations were made as an immediate response to abrogate Nazism and her
policies.
111
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declaration. The UDHR enjoined an active participation and input of delegates from Muslim
states.113 The correspondence of universal human rights and Islamic principles remained a concern
after adopting the UDHR and the two covenants. There are contributions of thoughts of the Islamic
tradition to the development and considerations of the UDHR.
4. 3.

Islamic Human Rights Declaration (IHRD)
The UDHR is a declaration. This means that it does not have imposing power, rather articles

from the declaration serve as incentives for adaptation and localization. This idea is important in
considering the application and use of human rights discourse in Muslim contexts. The UDHR
therefore, provided Muslim states norms used for engagement in their own formulations of human
rights.114 Thus, in 1972, the legitimacy of international human rights and laws was approved by
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and in 1990 enacted the Cairo Declaration of
Human Rights (CDHR). The CDHR developed its conceptualization of human rights which was
supported from Islamic teachings and sources (Qur’ān, ḥadīth).
The point of departure in the CDHR alludes that the “historical and civilizing role” of the
Islamic world, paved models for upholding human rights for all peoples. This idea is encapsulated
in the notion of maslaha.115 Both the Cairo Declaration and the UIDHR used conciliatory
statements in illustrating how innovations of universal human rights norms were upheld when
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Susan Waltz recorded the participation of Muslim states in creating not only the UDHR but all the two covenants[3]
comprising the International Bill of Human Rights. Waltz identified five objectives for delegates from countries with
the Islamic tradition: Religious freedom and the right to change religion; Indivisibility of rights and social justice,
gender equality in marriage; the right to self-determination; and implementation tools Cf. Waltz Suzan, Universal
Human Rights: “The Contribution of Muslim States”, Human Rights Quarterly n. 26 (2004): 799–844.
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Muslim states engaged in their own formulations in two aspects: both as a way of resistance to western powers and
as a constructive assertion of Islamic values.
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This is an important concept that we will get back to later when we consider the common grounds for both Sharia
and the UDHR
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“Islamic civilizations was at its heights.116 The foundation for human rights and freedom, the
document goes on to posits, is founded upon the instructions of justice and freedom in both the
Qur’an and in the shariʾa. In other words, human rights concerns are not estranged from Islam.117
Legal scholars in Islamic studies provide contrasting positions in the considerations of
codified Shariʾa and shariʾa in its essence or ideal.
4. 4.

Distinction between Shariʾa, Fiqh and Codified Law
Abdullahi An-Naʾim’s thoughts helps to illustrate the possible branching of Shariʾa into

two halves: In one hand, when Shariʾa is considered as a social construct for practical living it
could be enforced by the State. On the other hand, when it is sort for its spiritual and religious
underpinnings, we find its essence. Shariʾa consist of sources from the Qur’ān and the Sunna.
Divine revelation and examplars of the Holy Prophet are found there in respectively. These sources
are left to human rationale and interpretations fiqh (jurisprudence). Fiqh is carried out sometimes
by applying the sources literally to particular subjects being investigated. This approach is
reductionist in its manner and fails to take into consideration the context of the Shariʾa. In other
to avoid this pit hole, classical Islamic jurists came up with the concept of al-maqaṣīd. An-Naʾim
notes that the categorization of shari’a into codes by present governments of states produces
abuses This is evident in many histories. He opines that it is a religious obligation for Muslims to
follow Shariʾa, and this is done best when the government is not involved. Any interference by
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Mawdudi positions is that Islamic conceptions of certain rights supersedes conceptions in the western tradition,
such as freedom of expression. He averred that the qualitative difference is inherent in Islam’s refusal to “propagate
evil and wickedness”. Mawdudi corroborates this principle to the Islamic duty of commanding right and forbidding
wrong. Cf. Abu Aʾla Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam (London: The Islamic Foundation, 1976), p. 31
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Shannon Dunn observes that the position of the document presented in this way illustrates that both Islamic and
secular human rights frameworks are scarcely separated of philosophical or theological considerations about the
purpose and relationship of the human person with her community. Shannon Dunn, “Islamic Law and Human Rights”
in The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Law Ed. by Anver M. Emon and Rumee Ahmed. Date of Online Publication: Oct
2015 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199679010.013.26 (Accessed 10 July 2021).
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governments on religious doctrine automatically has an influence of the hegemony of such society.
Such religious law losses its essence. The historical events of al-Mihna in Islamic history is a vivid
example.
Mashood Baderin argues that fiqh could be advantageous for advancing human rights. He
writes: “The legitimizing force of Islamic law in Islamic societies can be positively impactful
through maturity and accommodation, for the enforcement of international human rights law in
the Muslim world.”118
4. 5.

Shariʾa’s Relatedness with International Human Rights Law
The general objectives of international human rights encourage states laws to acknowledge

the inherent dignity of human beings and to ensure norms that promote this position. Based on this
factor, there shall be no discrimination of persons on account of their religion, race, political status,
and the likes. The universal good of every human being is a common denominator for dealing with
people. This is not far from the Islamic concept of ‘al-maʿrūf’ (common good). Essentially,
Shariʾa charges under the doctrine ‘amr bi al-maʿrūf wa nahy ʿan al-munkar’ (encouraging the
good and discouraging evil).119 The objective of international rights concerns are in consonance
with the maqāsid al-shariʾa,120, which is the promotion of human well-being. Therefore, the idea

118

Cf. Mashood Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.
219.
This phrase is “[u]sed in the Quran nine times, referring to the collective duty of the Muslim community to
encourage righteous behaviour and demoralize immorality, as established by reasoning in the application of Islamic
moral thoughts and legal procedures. It aims to remove oppression from society and instead establish justice.
Applied to moral, social, political, and economic facets of life. It is, preferably, the distinguishing trait of the
Muslim nation”, confer John L. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003), p. 19.
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Baderin writes: “The concept of maqaṣīd is a normative principle of Islamic law formulated by classical Islamic
jurists to promote a contextual understanding of Shariʾa provisions. The full Arabic terminology for the principle
is ‘maqaṣīd al-Shari’a,’ which has been translated variously in the English language as “objects and purposes of
the Sharia.” Confer Mashood A. Baderin, International Human Rights and Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), p. 40.
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of maslaha have strong ties with human rights and should be discussed in the context of maqasid
al-Shariʾa. Such an intellectual route better illustrates the ties between human rights tradition and
Shariʾa traditions. Divine revelation in Islam alludes to the dignity and honour bestowed on every
human by Allah. The Quranic text 17:70121 reiterates this. It is therefore an obligation for
government institutions to respect all lives.
Islamic law is a human-made norms as an interpretation of the principles and objectives of
revealed (divine) law. Therefore, these norms are applicable to human living. The necessitation
for sharia therefore is the moral applications that laws obliges of us bound by our consciences.
Shariʾa is an inherent law in the hearts of all people and is more than mere codified laws.
Therefore, Shariʾa embraces both private and public lives.122 Shariʾa is classified into the
categories of hudūd, diya, taʿzir.
From the above analysis, it is evident that the same objectives (promotion of the common
good) are shared by international human rights norms and Shariʾa. Therefore, it is undeniably
erroneous to assume that Shariʾa has no point of connection with human right concerns. A greater
appreciation for the complementary roles that Shariʾa and internal rights bodies share will help
promote a better humane world for all to live in.
Regarding the zinā cases of Safiyatu Husseini and Amina Lawal, why were the
lower shariʾa courts unable to meet the conclusive standards of human rights while the higher
court succeeded?

Quran 17:70 reads, “We have honoured the children of Adam [that is, human beings], and carried them on land
and sea, and provided them with good things, and preferred them greatly over many of those We created.”
122
Cf. Malik Sayed, ‘Shari’a: A Legal System and a Way of Life,’ in Oloyede Abdul-Rahmon (ed), Perspectives in
Islamic Law and Jurisprudence (Ibadan: Polygraph Venture, 2001) 25–26.
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4. 6.

Proffered Consideration for the inability of the Lower Shariʾa Courts to meet Human

Rights Standards
The convictions passed by the lower shariʾa courts in both zinā cases of Safiyatu and
Amina have left doubts about the claims of the maqāsid al-shariʾa being compatible to the general
goals of international human rights law, that is, promotion of human well-being. Closer analysis
reveals that the lower shariʿa courts had applied reductionist understandings and applications of
the Shariʾa’s principles in many facets on the crime of zinā. Some of these areas include their poor
understanding of the principle of doubt, withdrawal of confession, interference of fair investigation
and trial practice by the interpretation of slander (qadhf), limited understanding and application
of rajm penalty for zinā.
4. 6. 1. The Principle of Established Doubt in Zinā Crimes.
On the authority of Al-Mirghinani, it is submitted that zinā is “sexual intercourse between
a man and a woman without legal right or the semblance of legal right.”123
Zinā is defined as follows:
Whoever, [being a man or a woman] fully responsible, has sexual intercourse through the
genital of a person over whom he has no sexual rights, and in the circumstance in which
no doubt exists as to the illegality of the act, is guilty of the offense of zinā.124
Zinā falls under the category of ḥad. The definition of zina may differ from one school of fiqh to
the other. However, Islamic law experts posit that the essential point is the idea of “willful
intercourse”. Therefore, in cases where doubt is established by the lack of willful participation of
either of the parties ḥadd is not administered.
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Al-Mirghinani (n 9) III, 344.
The Zamfara Sharia Penal Code, 2000, Section 92. Also, confer Ruud Peters, Islamic Criminal Law in
Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum, 2003), p. 62.
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4. 6. 1. 1.

The Lower Shariʾa Court’s Treatment of Doubt in Safiyatu Husseini’s Case

Safiyatu Husseini had reported that Yakubu raped her. In her words, she said:
He met me in the bush; the whole thing turned to madness. He subdued me with his power
and assaulted me. There was also a time I went to a nearby village. He subdued me again
and had carnal knowledge of me. It happened three times.125
The jurisprudence of the lower shariʾa court simply convicted Safiyatu as a perpetrator of zinā on
account of her pregnancy. The judges did not evaluate the case from the stand view of her claims
of being raped, which would have substantiated Safiyatu’s unwilling participation in the act, and
would have helped in building a case on shariʾa principle of doubt. Imam Malik acknowledged
the chance of a woman getting pregnant in an unwilled act of sexual intercourse and has made
several standards that aim to protect any innocent party from hadd.126 Rather, the lower court
simply carried on with the case and established the crime of zinā against Safiyatu based on the fact
of her pregnancy. The actions of the lower sharia courts posit a false presentation and lack of
understanding of the Maliki principles. Maliki jurisprudence accepts pregnancy as a matter of
principle but not as conclusive evidence for the crime of zinā.
Some considerations for safe guarding innocence of women even when they are found with
child in zinā cases are based on the principle of doubt (shubha). One of the principles is the
application of the concept of gestation duration. This is linked to the idea within Maliki madhabs
that it is possible for gestation of a child to last for five years. It is referred to as a “sleeping
fetus.”127 . Al-Dardir’s commentary on Mukhtasar states: “If a woman during her waiting period
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Okorie Uguru interviewed Safiya, ‘Amina Lawal: Let Off the Hook” in The Comet 27 September, 2003. p. 11.
Cf. Al-Zurqaani, Hashiyat Al-Zurqani Ala Muwatta’ Al Imam Malik, Beirut, Dar Al-Ma’rifah, 1989, Vol. 4, p.150.
Ruud Peters, Islamic Criminal Law in Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum, 2003), p. 4 (n. 24)
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(idda) is not sure whether or not she is pregnant, she must wait the maximum period of gestation
which is according to some scholars five years and according to others four.”128
Another form of establishing doubt is where there is the element of rape. Circumstantial
pieces of evidence are needed for establishment. Evidences for such a case requires four witnesses
who saw the act happen and the place where it took place. Evidence of bruise and blood from
forced penetration are also required. In the absence of evidences such as these, the case
automatically constitutes doubt and as such the accusation of zinā should be dismissed.
This court failed to consider the concept of doubt (shubha) on the fact of Safiyatu’s report
of rape.
4. 6. 1. 2.

Lower Shariʾa Court Poor Interpretation of Retraction of Confession (Ihizari)

in Amina Lawal and Safiyatu Husseini Cases
Amina Lawal was convicted for zinā based on account of her pregnancy and the eventual
birth of her daughter (who was delivered outside of marriage). Also, she had confessed to the crime
with Yahayya in the Local Shariʾa court, Bakori. This was partly attributed to the fact that the
word “adultery” covered by the Arabic word “zinā” and its penalty had not been explained, so she
did not understand the charge and its implications before her. The provision for izari which enables
the accused to comment on the matter was hardly given to her. She appealed for a second judgment
on the matter in the Upper Shariʾa court in Funtua where she retracted her claims about Yahayya
and appealed that her baby's pregnancy and birth were a result of a “sleeping embryo” from her
previous marriage. The judges of the upper shariʾa court had ruled that her initial confession stood
as proof for conviction and insisted that she could not retract. The lack of the provision of izari is
a similar phenomenon in Safiyatu’s case. The pregnancy and birth of her child, Adamah, was

Sidi Ahmad Al-Dardir, Sharh al-Kabir ala Mukhtasar Khalil (Dar Ihya’ al-Kutub alArabiyyah, Cairo 1980) II, p.
474.
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already used as prima facie, proof for zinā. The provision for izari, which allowed her to make
remarks such that changing her plea at any stage, meant the change in the proceedings too, was
not afforded her. Instead of izari the judges of the lower courts merely ensured that the women
were informed that their offenses were zinā. Amina and Safiyatu were not given a chance to reform
(ihizari). In Amina’s case, the judges of the Upper Shariʾa court ruled in favour of the
Local Shariʾa court in submitting that her initial confession stood as proof for conviction and
insisted that she could not retract.
4. 6. 1. 3

Limiting Sharia’s Reach for Justice via Restrictive Reliance on the Use of

Maliki Jurisprudence
Methodologically, selecting legal opinion from one school or another should not be in
violation of conclusive principles of Shariʾa, including human rights. Rather, it enriches the ends
of shariʾa, which is to promote the well-being of the human person. The negligence of thinking
that every case could simply be resolved by recourse to the orthodox books of Maliki fiqh added
weight to the poor impression of the deficiency of sharia rulings in the lower courts. Despite the
availability of the sources of fiqh for consultation, it appears that the judges of the lower court give
greater and sometimes sole adherence and reliance on Maliki fiqh. The logic behind this practice,
it seems, is in order to ensure some level of consistency and accountability for judges against being
accused of being biased. This conservative attitude to Maliki jurisprudence, A. A. Gwandu
observed, had been the approach to Maliki jurisprudence texts in matters of administrative
application of justice since the time of the Sokoto Caliphate:
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The confusion that could arise if judges would be permitted to base their rulings on more
than one school of law would be apparent. The possibility of some judges using that to give
conflicting verdicts on identical cases brought before them is strong. In other to forestall
this, Sheikh Abdullah, in particular, insisted that all decisions of a judge must be rooted
not only on the Maliki School of law but solely on the most widely accepted view of the
school in cases where there is more than one view.129
Evidently, the above quotation hints that most likely these qadis were hindered from exercising
ijtihad all in the bid to maintain judicial consistency. In Islamic jurisprudence, it is not an absolute
law to restrict shariʾa within the confines of a particular school. Regardless of personal affiliation
to a particular school of jurisprudence (in the Nigerian case, Maliki madhab), juridical processes
through the ages allowed for flexibility. Judges of one madhab could also apply supportive
principles from established rules of other Islamic schools, especially in the attempt to
apply maqasid al-shariʾa.
Ongoing education of Qadis in Islamic law must be put in place to guarantee up-to-date
knowledge of Shariʾa stipulations and applications, not only in Maliki jurisprudence but the
other madhābs. Islamic jurisprudence does not restrict shariʾa of other madhabs. Qadis should be
required to study in-depth130 and be supported with the time and resources required. Such
requirements help to ensure that those who eventually get to be The principle of al-maslahah,
should be incorporated into in judicial dealings. Qadis are intelligent enough to apply the
principles of ijtihad properly, especially in cases presented before them for which there are needs
for modern considerations. The principle of al-maslahah, should be incorporated into in judicial
dealings. Such a task requires good funding for proper training. Therefore, state governments in

AA Gwandu, “Aspect of Administration of Justice in Sokoto Caliphate and Shaykh Abdullahi Ibn Fodio’s
Contribution to It,” in Syed Khalid Rashid (ed) Islamic Law in Nigeria: Application and Teaching (Islamic
Publication Bureau, Lagos 1988), p. 24.
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which Shariʾa law abide should be supportive via financial supports for the recurring training of
judges assigned to Sharia courts of the three strata.
The state government should establish advisory boards and supervisory bodies made up of
new and existing officials and experts of fiqh with the mandate to assist the implementation of
Shariʾa.
These explanations mentioned above for the poor application of shariʾa tend to postulate
an irreconcilable status with human rights concerns. Yet, within the considerations of the rulings
on the matter by the shariʾa appeal court, we establish shariʾa relationship with conventional
human rights principles.
4. 7.

The Rulings of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts as bridges for compatibility with UHRD
In these cases, the proceedings in the Shariʾa Court of Appeals provide an interesting

understanding of the essence of shariʾa since they serve as a sanitizer of the judicial systems of
the lower shariʾa courts. Evaluating the cases of appeal, the judges of the Shariʾa appeal courts
submitted that the faults are not inherently in shariʾa but with lies with the interpretation and
execution by the lower courts.
They Shariʾa appeal court submitted that the way of shariʾa is to inquire different ways in
order not to apply hadd in accordance with the Quʾrān which enjoins: “Do not kill a soul which
Allah has made sacred except through due process”131; “The greatest sin is to associate something
with God and to kill human beings”132; “And whosoever saves a life it is as though he has saved
the lives of all mankind”.133
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Regarding retraction of confession, the Shariʾa appeal court’s rulings held that shariʾa legal
tradition allows for the possibility of changing one’s confession. With regards to Safiyatu Husseini,
her request for redress by the Appeal court was necessary because there were abnormalities carried
out by the lower courts. The judgement of the previous court was overturned because Safiyatu did
not comprehend the charges laid against her since she had not learnt Arabic language. The court
established that the explanation of the offense made by the judges in the lower court was deficient
in helping her to understand. The Shariʾa appeal courts posited that the judges of the lower courts
failed to garner salient pieces of information like the places and times when the crime occurred.
These judges also failed to offer her izari.
As the judges explains, “Where a situation gets confused with respect to ḥadd punishment,
you should leave the ḥadd at any opportunity because there is no doubt that ḥadd punishment can
be set aside by Subha”.134 Such is the situation with Sufiyatu Husseni.
The attitude of the Shariʾa jurisprudence is in circumventing hadd punishment and seeking
the conversion of life via mercy.
4. 8.

Reevaluation of Ḥudūd and its Interpretation and Application to the Zinā Cases
Ḥudūd (sing. ḥadd) is the penal law of shariʾa. Ḥadd laws are restrictive decrees in respect

to lawful and unlawful things.135 It is observable that the word ḥudūd is restrictively applied to
“fixed penalties established to be the right of Allah.” 136 In other words, it is fixed as the right of
God by the Qur'an, and as observed in the Sunna. Reacting to the restrictive perception of the
definition of ḥadd as solely fixed without nuances in its application, Imran Nianzee argues that the
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term ḥadd, is historically upheld as penalties for certain offenses and not fixed punishment when
we consider how the closest companions to the prophet administered it. Furthermore, it is
discernable that contrary to variant punishments applied for hadd according to the sunna only few
of these are categorized as hadd. It is plausible that hadd as assumed today are constructs of
judges. These disparities question the “fixed” sense applied to ḥad as held by jurists.137
An element substantiating the degree of culpability in the crime of zinā is the idea of
“willful intercourse”. The penalty for zina in the formative annals of Islam was home arrest. The
culprit was left in solitude in their homes till their eventual demise. Soon afterward, the Quranic
revelation averred some further legislation. Allah said:
The fornicators (male and female), flog each of them with a hundred stripes. In their case,
do not let pity stop you in a punishment ordered by Allah if you believe in Allah and the
Last Day. Let one of the believers witness their punishment.138
Following this revelation is the verse that prohibits Muslims from getting married to anyone
formally guilty of zinā.139 By inference, this will mean that death was not ipso facto used for zinā.
Conclusive Remarks
This chapter identified that it is within the consideration of hudūd that Shariʾa is perceived
to be at cross purposes with international human rights norms. The consideration oof hudūd to
mean immutable and gross inflicting punishments for certain crimes disagrees with the principles
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which forbids enforced charging of death
punishment. Thus, the convictions of the crime of zinā in the cases against Safiyatu Husseini and
Amina Lawal by the lower Shariʾa are justifications of sharia incompatibility with human rights.
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Cf. Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law: The Methodology of Ijtihad (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic
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Contrary to this view, the chapter postulated that there are commonly shared principles of the wellbeing of human life, founded on the notions of “principles and objectives” behind both the UDHR
and the Shariʾa ideology maslaha and maqasid al-shariʾa. It went on to demonstrate how the
rulings of the Shariʾa Appeal Courts demonstrate the bridge between Shariʾa and international
Human rights norms for all human rights, especially in as it relates to zinā cases with regards to
women rights.
A recommendation to help foster better development of the Shariʾa Penal code is to emulate
the model of the Shariʾa committee of 1958-1962: The committee took successive stages (study,
implementations, reevaluations, and eventual draft of shariʾa legislations) at developing and
applying the Shariʾa in their attempt at bridging Shariʾa law in the penal code of 1960 with human
rights concerns.
Recently, in Ahmadu Bello University, in Zaria, the Institute for Islamic Legal Studies has
begun a project backed by the federal government together with fiqh jurist and specialist, together
with civil lawyers, including representatives of the relevant states, to work on the penal
codes.140 This is a praiseworthy task.
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Its particular objective is to harmonize Shari’a Penal Code in order to strengthen fiqh and aid proper formation of
all individuals involved in fiqh exercises. Those participating in this task are Qadis from the Shariʾa Appeal Courts
and other experts of law to help consider and improve a holistic view of the shariʾa penal codes.
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